

HOWARD KIMELDORF INTERVIEWS FOR *REDS OR RACKETS?*
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INTERVIEWEE: STANLEY WEIR

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[00:00:00] **HOWARD KIMELDORF:** —on April twenty-second, in Los Angeles, California. Now I guess you had an opportunity to read the proposal that I sent you. It was very sketchy, so what I wanted to do today was fill in some of the gaps as much as possible based on your own experience and everything.

First of all, I'd like to find out what your experiences have been on the waterfront and how long you worked there, when you worked there and just generally your own biographical information.

[00:00:29] **STANLEY WEIR:** I was a merchant sea for 11 years. [clock chiming in background] I was a registered longshoreman for four years. I was fired from the waterfront with 81 others in 1963. And the ranks

tried to save us. We were fired by a joint committee of the union, top union officials, and the employer. When they failed to save us, we filed a lawsuit. The lawsuit lasted 17 years, and we just lost in the Supreme Court.

[00:01:08] **HOWARD:** Oh, you did?

[00:01:08] **STANLEY:** Supreme Court refused, so that was that. All told, I guess I was a maritime worker for 16 years.

[00:01:25] **HOWARD:** That was up in San Francisco [California] , the local that you were de-registered from, right?

[00:01:30] **STANLEY:** Yes.

[00:01:30] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[00:01:31] **STANLEY:** I've been involved in a longshore study of my own here for five years.

[00:01:38] **HOWARD:** Oh, is that right?

[00:01:39] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[00:01:39] **HOWARD:** Do you know John Laslett at UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles] ? He mentioned that he thought you were involved in research on the longshore industry.

I wanted to ask you some sort of general questions that don't draw as much on your own background—perhaps they do—but just your knowledge of working class politics and such. One of the essential problems of the research is to try and understand the relationship between working class militancy as a trade union form of behavior as opposed to something called “political radicalism.” One of the conundrums of this research, in fact, is to try and identify whether what's taking place on the West Coast is really something called “working class radicalism,” or just a very militant response. People digging in. Do you have any thoughts about that, just generally? And then in terms of the longshore industry? That's a big question.

[00:02:34] **STANLEY:** Merchant seamen, who always show up in the forefront of—they become revolutionaries throughout the world. It's because even subconsciously they understand power. Because a ship that leaves the dock is a floating molecular state. There's a high number of seamen amongst longshoremen. The two trades interweave. When you quit going to sea, you get married and have a family or make a try at it, how can you use your skills? A deckhand, in particular, on shore. What's better than being a longshoreman? It's natural. You make contacts among longshoremen.

I was a merchant seaman. I was recruited to the socialist movement on the ships. In San Francisco, because of its geography, North Beach is right at the waterfront. As a merchant seaman or a longshoreman, you go to a restaurant, you're liable to run into bohemians, politicals, and recruitment takes place in both directions. That is, you'll find bohemians working extra in longshore gangs, from time to time, and you'll find longshoremen getting recruited to intellectualism and radical ideology. So it's very hard to separate the two. San Francisco has the strongest concentration the Communist Party ever had in major city in the country.

[00:04:29] **HOWARD:** More than New York?

[00:04:29] **STANLEY:** It had more people in New York. But they had more of an impact on the culture of San Francisco, per capita and because of the strategic location automatically created by the geography of San Francisco with the peninsula. North Beach being so close to the waterfront.

Quite the contrary here, where we're so far from anything that might be an intellectual community. Because of the greater sense of isolation from the general community, here on this waterfront, you have less general politicalization but more trade union militancy. You have the seaman [?Martin Lipsett?] when you're operating in a port like this, far more than San Francisco.

[00:05:14] **HOWARD:** That's interesting. So it's sort of an isolated mass of that solid occupational community. Do have a sense about the Northwest ports? How you would put them along this spectrum between political radicalism and trade unionism?

[00:05:35] **STANLEY:** Well, you had the IWW [Industrial Workers of the World] in the woods, strong. Of course they had a tremendous effect on those ports. The IWW and its syndicalist traditions are still a part of the Northwest ports.

[00:05:47] **HOWARD:** What about L.A. [Los Angeles] ? Because I know I read one of your articles—

[00:05:51] **STANLEY:** L.A., yeah.

[00:05:53] **HOWARD:** The Wobblies, you said, are very strong here.

[00:05:55] **STANLEY:** Very strong because you can winter over here and not freeze to death.

[00:05:57] **HOWARD:** It's the climate.

[00:05:57] **STANLEY:** Yeah. Liberty Hill [San Pedro 1923 Strike] occurs here.

[00:06:06] **HOWARD:** Oh yeah. That's the free speech? Yeah.

[00:06:10] **STANLEY:** And the Wobblies conducted their last real their big strike nationally right here in this port. 1922 [sic,] longshore strike. When I was sailing out of here in 1941, there were still Wobblies on the waterfront working. I remember two winch drivers—I think they were both American Indian and Wobbly. I sailed—I was on the lumber schooners. Running to Coos Bay [Oregon] to Columbia River [Portland, Oregon] and Puget Sound [Seattle, Washington] . I would say that six out of eleven of us had red books we used right up until 1936. [?Frenchie Marine and Blackie Merchant?] —guys like that.

[00:07:08] **HOWARD:** Why then, if they had that Wobbly tradition to draw on in Los Angeles, why did the port seem so porous in terms of its strike in '34?

[00:07:18] **STANLEY:** Open shop town, right?

[00:07:20] **HOWARD:** Ok. So despite the fact that there was a strong Wobbly tradition to draw on, the open-shop nature of Los Angeles undermined?

[00:07:33] **STANLEY:** Well, in this town, during the strike, there wasn't a picketing operation. In this town, it was stockades with scabs in them. Squads would go over the fence at night and break four, five collarbones, legs, and so on. And leave these guys nagging [sic] and go back out. That would terrorize the scabs. As the scabs drive back to the hotel, on Fifth [Street] and Main [Street] where they were being housed, a car always

had a rumble seat, it was fast, they'd go ahead of the car of scab, the guy sitting in the rumble seat could heave a heavy shackle through the windshields and then they would drive on. My partner's father was a leader of one of these squadrons. He was so traumatized by what he had participated in when the strike was over that he had regular nightmares. He had himself transferred to be a longshoreman on Catalina Island to get out. He never got over it. It was war. He was like a veteran, he was like shell-shocked.

[00:08:50] **HOWARD:** So it was certainly an intense and violent struggle. That wasn't absent.

[00:08:54] **STANLEY:** Two guys were killed here.

[00:08:56] **HOWARD:** Oh, I remember reading about that. On the docks. That was in the early phases of the strike, right?

[00:09:01] **STANLEY:** Well, more actually. There was a third and fourth. One was killed on Beacon Street, by the Shanghai Reds [restaurant]. After a fight with a scab that got broken up by a gang that killed him. Literally, the guys were fired upon, [Parker?] and somebody else. They killed them. We don't hear much about this, but you hear only about the two guys in San Francisco and Bloody Thursday.

[00:09:29] **HOWARD:** What about the relationship—

[00:09:37] **STANLEY:** Marxists have claimed that everything is in two ideologies—bourgeois and proletariat. When the working class doesn't make it, it's because of false ideology. George Rudé, in *Ideology and Popular Protest*, bridges the gap. Says there's a third ideology. It comes from the middle class, from the intellectuals. It's a derived ideology, as compared to the inherent ideology of the working class. Whenever there is a merge or a marginalization of the two ideologies, an alliance between the two, that's when you get real change. That's when you get real consciousness.

[00:10:32] **HOWARD:** An alliance between the middle class and the proletariat ideology?

[00:10:35] **STANLEY:** Through the radical intellectuals.

[00:10:37] **HOWARD:** Ok. So that socially it's the Leninist thesis over again, right? The working class people out for themselves will develop that militant trade union consciousness, without—

[00:10:47] **STANLEY:** Mmm, no, I wouldn't—Rudé says no. I agree.

[00:10:52] **HOWARD:** How is it different, then? I guess I'm just not clear.

[00:10:55] **STANLEY:** Rudé says that Marxists have generally look upon it as their task to develop the working class ideology. Not so. The intellectuals investigate the basis of their own radicalization and develop their own complaints about society before they see a new society. With everything, they talk in terms of power. Thereupon, it's possible for the two groupings—critical masses of the workers and the intellectuals—to work together in an alliance. That it's not a matter of the workers not being to reach revolutionary consciousness, but a matter of workers not articulating that consciousness. Where there isn't any form where it gets out there to be used, the intellectuals, by their advantages, are able to articulate, document, write about, and so on.

[00:12:01] **HOWARD:** Ok. To bring that sort of instinctual class consciousness to fruition because the—

[00:12:11] **STANLEY:** To bring focus on what one is doing upon particular power bastions, and be ready to substitute one form of control. I'll give you an example. The key to understanding the West Coast is the fact that

in 1921-22, the employers first in Seattle, then in Los Angeles, then in Portland, instituted their own hiring halls. Central hiring halls. One per port.

[00:12:45] **HOWARD:** Right.

[00:12:47] **STANLEY:** San Francisco didn't have that. Shape-up started in '34. These longshoremen in these other three major ports had for 13 years an example of how a port might be run operating in front of them. "If the employers run this hiring hall wrong, we could run it right. We could control our own hiring." They were after workers' control; they didn't call it that. The derived ideology of intellectuals begins to see that as workers' control and then begins to structure it.

[00:13:29] **HOWARD:** Ok, so it's a structured consciousness now. Let me ask you a question about that, too, because it's occurred to me that that's probably a significant level of difference—the fact that there were functioning employer halls of some sort. Hiring halls. Do you think that had anything to do with the stability of the labor force in the Northwest and Los Angeles in particular? Because they tended to regularize or de-casualize employment somewhat. Certainly, the employers were in charge of it. But I wonder if that somehow generated a sense of solidarity among the workers because there was less of a turnover. Whereas in New York there was sometimes 60-70 percent more workers than you needed on any given day.

[00:14:13] **STANLEY:** I'm not certain. If I'm an employer in this port in 1921, the port stretched from Twenty-second Street in San Pedro all the way around. [clock chimes] I need to dispatch people. The piers are not close together. In Seattle, the piers are spread all the way from the silk docks all the way around almost to Tacoma. In Portland, they are spread all over hell's half acre.

[00:14:59] **HOWARD:** [Inaudible] .

[00:15:00] **STANLEY:** In San Francisco, 90 percent of what was going on in that port was on the Embarcadero in particular, on odd-numbered piers. If I don't get hired today at Pier 39, I can walk to Pier 27 or even to Pier 5. To Pier 22 or 32 and get a job. So that shape-up hiring fit the concentration of piers in the 'Frisco [San Francisco, California] waterfront, and it didn't with these other ports.

[00:15:31] **HOWARD:** That's an interesting idea. Because New York is supposed to be also very concentrated, isn't it, geographically?

[00:15:39] **STANLEY:** Well, you've got Manhattan, particularly the Hudson River, the north river. That's one concentration. You've got two concentrations in [New] Jersey. You've got Green Point, Staten Island. So even the port itself is spread all over. Now the employers can play off Green Point against Staten Island, against Manhattan, against Hoboken, against wherever. The reason why—this is in the paper, I was going to bring it up—if you're gonna understand why with different developments, you gotta understand the ports on the West Coast were small enough to be run by one hiring hall. New York, which is the key port to the whole East Coast, in its entirety, because you can handle in New York all the shipping on the East Coast, if the other ports are on strike. One hiring hall's not enough. You gotta have a hiring hall for Brooklyn, a hiring hall for Hoboken, Manhattan, and south. Well, if in Hoboken, they're acting up militantly, the ships don't dock there. They go to Brooklyn.

[00:17:04] **HOWARD:** So it would require port-wide unity.

[00:17:06] **STANLEY:** Right. When we can't get port-wide unity because it's such a big port, you're going to have the corruption that goes along with employer shape-ups.

[00:17:18] **HOWARD:** Why corruption necessarily?

[00:17:20] **STANLEY:** Shape-up has to be corrupt. If anyone acts militant or they resist, I have a way of keeping that man out. I just don't select him when I'm hiring. If we have one man doing the hiring for one pier every morning, it's very easy to piece that man off and get hired by kickback. If the kickback becomes structured and systematized, then we have racketeering. Where racketeering is, you get conservative politics. You have two alternatives—you could run it democratically, or undemocratically. In order to run it democratically, you've got to run it. You can't run it in New York. You can in San Francisco. It's that concentrated.

[00:18:18] **HOWARD:** Ok, so you're saying the critical role here being the geographic concentration of the waterfront facilities in San Francisco—

[00:18:24] **STANLEY:** Maybe not "the"—nothing is ever just one—

[00:18:26] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I understand that.

[00:18:27] **STANLEY:** I'm saying this is a principal of the thing.

[00:18:32] **HOWARD:** Ok, now, people have suggested—critics of the waterfront have suggested during the war, during the late-thirties particularly, that pointing out the inefficiency of the shape-up as far as the employers were concerned—they would have their shape-ups three times a day, and if you missed one at 7 am, you couldn't get hired there, you didn't have time to get to another pier on the same region. So it was grossly inefficient. So there should have been an incentive, I would think, for the employers to institute some sort of centralized, employer-controlled hiring hall in the various regions of the New York waterfront. There'd never been an equal incentive for them to do that? As it was in Seattle, or L.A., or someplace like that?

[00:19:09] **STANLEY:** Well, if you have strong national groupings—Italians, Irish, early on Jews in New York—

[00:19:23] **HOWARD:** On the waterfront?

[00:19:25] **STANLEY:** Absolutely.

[00:19:26] **HOWARD:** Whereabouts? Brooklyn or something?

[00:19:28] **STANLEY:** I'm not sure right now. But there was a large number of Jewish longshoremen in New York. It's extremely hard for a hiring hall to break down that subculture, for an employer hall to deal with. Better to hire an Italian to deal with direct.

[00:19:52] **HOWARD:** Mm-hmm. But that wasn't efficient.

[00:19:54] **STANLEY:** It was very efficient as far as control was.

[00:19:58] **HOWARD:** Oh, ok.

[00:19:58] **STANLEY:** Employers will always sacrifice general production efficiency to control.

[00:20:07] **HOWARD:** I don't perceive it—from my reading, it doesn't seem to be any threat from the working class in New York on the waterfront during that period. At least not the same kind of threat that was being waged on the West Coast.

[00:20:19] **STANLEY:** No, not the same—

[00:20:24] **HOWARD:** If I could interrupt you, I remember reading one of your articles, and this very provocative point you made, that the shape-up happening as frequently as it did, every four hours, was a mechanism to breaking up the work groups. So that they couldn't even form in the process of eight hours. Do you really think that that was a subconscious or even a conscious motive on behalf of the employers?

[00:20:42] **STANLEY:** I think that was conscious. The maritime employers, whereas they hire very rough-and-tumble first line management, had been for some time among the most sophisticated employers in a way.

I'll give you a bit of indirect evidence. In 1959 and '60, the PMA [Pacific Maritime Association] negotiated the first M&M [Mechanization and Modernization Agreement] with [Harry] Bridges. One of the things accomplished by that contract was a clause which said that the basic hold gain on break bulk man-handled cargo from that point forward would be four men. And they were still using six and eight—six on the discharge, and eight on the steady job, the loading dock. So that four men would be members of the gang in the hold, which is the basic point of production. But two of four would be swing men and could be hired or fired individually. They still had it that if you wanted to fire one gang member, you had to fire the whole gang. That was the tradition, even though they got rid of that work rule, that was the tradition that the men were hanging on to even though they didn't have it in the contract. But what you did was you split up the autonomy, you broke the autonomy of the work group as a whole with that clause. They [the employers] were sophisticated enough to know [sound of ball bouncing] that even though they weren't getting any reduction in manning scale, they were being able to break up the previous unity of that group.

[00:22:39] **HOWARD:** I've got that on tape, I'll have to think about it. Because they could fire these individual members of it, right? Is that. . . ?

[00:22:47] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[00:22:47] **HOWARD:** Ok, hmm, that's interesting. It's always difficult to judge a man's mind, and the relationship between, as you call it, general efficiency versus the attempt to control the working class. I suppose both were operative in different circumstances.

[00:23:06] **STANLEY:** When you drive through the waterfront today, you have these big cranes. That's control. There are five times as many [inaudible] cranes in this port as are needed. Any port town is supposed to handle the whole coast. Install that system of loading and unloading ships—you've got control. You've broken down the old hiring hall system. Containing yards have steady men hired directly by employer. Those cranes, those [inaudible] cranes, are a symbol of port control.

[00:23:49] **HOWARD:** What percentage of people stayed, do you have any idea?

[00:23:53] **STANLEY:** At the outside, I'd say 15 percent.

[00:23:57] **HOWARD:** So it isn't so much the numerical significance then, but what it symbolizes?

[00:24:00] **STANLEY:** I don't know what it symbolizes, but they are a cadre that can get out the work if necessary. They owe their allegiance to the employer for hiring them.

[00:24:16] **HOWARD:** What's their relationship to the union? They're technically union members.

[00:24:19] **STANLEY:** They're union. Absolutely.

[00:24:21] **HOWARD:** But they're not dispatched through the union hall. They're permanently employed. What's that called?

[00:24:26] **STANLEY:** 9.43.

[00:24:29] **HOWARD:** 9.43.

Let me go back in time a little bit because we were talking about the Wobblies and their significance. I make that the argument that they were not as prevalent and as organizationally viable in New York as they were on the West Coast. Does that seem to resonate at all with your experience?

[00:24:47] **STANLEY:** Absolutely.

[00:24:48] **HOWARD:** Do you have any idea why that might be so?

[00:24:52] **STANLEY:** Well, the whole history of the Wobblies. The main concentration is in hard rock mining, lumber, and maritime. Any casual industry of the West Coast, from agriculture to [inaudible] to railroad, they didn't sit well in factories.

[00:25:17] **HOWARD:** Why not maritime in New York? I know they were active with the seamen. They appeared to have been more active with the seamen in New York. Many of those people learned about it through the NMU [National Maritime Union] , as I understand. But not the longshoremen.

[00:25:28] **STANLEY:** There was no surrounding industry to support them. If I worked in the woods, and the season ends, I can easily go to a mill. I can easily go to a waterfront. I can easily go to a ship. There was no shore-side industry to support Wobbly seamen in New York. In all these ports—all northern ports had lumber and maritime. The California ports had maritime and casual agriculture. Los Angeles County was the largest agriculture-producing county in the country until after World War II. Plus warm weather.

[00:26:22] **HOWARD:** Yeah. You mentioned that. Were they as prevalent in San Francisco? I had a sense that they weren't. Of all the places on the West Coast, there seem to have been less of a presence of Wobblies there. Of course, when the CP [Communist Party] comes around, it's a different story.

[00:26:38] **STANLEY:** Again, it's easier to get an agricultural job here. At that time, there were large farms on these hills. In San Francisco, where did one go and what did one do? You get a flophouse cheap on the waterfront. But in order to get down into the valley, you had to hitchhike all the way to Modesto [California] . Well, at that time, that was a little trip. There was no lumber. You had to go to Redding [California] . You had to get up to the woods. That was a longer trip even. So that it was a little more difficult. I'm sure there must have been other reasons. However, you must understand that business unionism dug in in San Francisco right after the Gold Rush. The Teamsters organized independently and affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as an already organized union in the late-1880s. I'd say '86, something like that. [inaudible] . But wherever there are firmly established business unions, the Wobblies are not going to do as well.

[00:28:11] **HOWARD:** Which might explain New York because the ILA [International Longshoremen's Association] was much more viable there before the war and during the period of the First World War than it was on the West Coast.

[00:28:19] **STANLEY:** Possibly. I don't know. I haven't even thought about it.

[00:28:24] **HOWARD:** What about the ethnicity question? I know that New York was basically fractionalized into an Italian and an Irish port, and things like that.

[00:28:33] **STANLEY:** The Black—there was a Black port—

[00:28:35] **HOWARD:** I guess, yeah. How does that compare with the situation on the West Coast? I know very little about the ethnic composition.

[00:28:44] **STANLEY:** We had a lot of Scandinavians and Finns in the Northwest. But you had a fair few people because of the lumber [inaudible] . All the Finns and the squareheads [disparaging slang for Germanic people, especially Swedes] Scandinavians would buy salmon, large salmon, every trip north. They'd take it right home to Mama, and she'd can it. All winter long they'd eat salmon bellies.

There was something else here—fishing was important, too. Yugoslavs, who came here pretty political already. [clock chiming] They understood syndicalism and anarchism. I don't know. . .

[00:29:25] **HOWARD:** Were the Italians much of a presence? I understood that they were in San Francisco along the waterfront.

[00:29:46] **STANLEY:** Yeah, and here.

[END PART ONE/BEGIN PART TWO]

STANLEY—right in the town. The bulk of them come from around Naples [Italy] , from Ischia [island outside of Naples] .

[00:29:57] **HOWARD:** Oh, they do?

[00:30:00] **STANLEY:** As fishermen.

A lot of the Yugoslavs were recruited to the hard rock mines and came here after. There's a history of Yugoslavs in this town on the waterfront whose fathers came from Yugoslavia to Arizona as hard rock miners, and then came to this waterfront.

[00:30:33] **HOWARD:** Perhaps made contact with the Western Federation of Miners then, right?

[00:30:36] **STANLEY:** Possibly.

[00:30:38] **HOWARD:** So it seems like, on top of the structural features on each coast, there may have been distinctly different paths of importing radical ideologies. Might be worth exploring. The other side of the question before the '34 strike concerns the actions of the employers. I think most people who've written on this argue that the employers on the West Coast were much more belligerent than they were on the East Coast. As you may recall from reading my proposal, one of the hypotheses I'm working on was that there was a greater

degree of employer concentration on the West Coast than on the East Coast. Does that seem to have much credibility? Would you know about that?

For instance, I think in my mind there was three major shipping operations on the West Coast: Dollar [Dollar Steamship Line] , Hawaiian [American-Hawaiian Steamship Line] , and Matson [Matson, Inc.] . Later they merge, of course. But on the East Coast, it's seems like there's a proliferation of fairly middle-sized, sometimes large, shipping firms.

[00:31:45] **STANLEY:** I don't know. The existence of so many concentrations in the total port of New York—there's Staten Island, Hoboken, Newark, Jersey City, Greenpoint, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and so on. Which facilitated the shape-up. Shape-up facilitates a multiplicity, a large number of labor contractors. If you get large numbers of labor contractors, you can't take these unsophisticated types into the sophisticated shipping association of waterfront employers. They acted as a group at the time who resisted control by the ship operators and limited their power.

Here, where you have concentrated ports and smaller ports, labor contracting was not as widespread. There wasn't this additional competition to ship operators.

[00:33:04] **HOWARD:** Ok, so the stevedore operators were much more prominent in the East Coast, you would argue, than on the West.

[00:33:08] **STANLEY:** Particularly—I'm talking about New York, yes. I really don't know enough, but I sense this was true in Philly [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] and Baltimore [Maryland] . Maybe not Boston [Massachusetts] . Boston was Irish and Italian. They kept the two kind of separate. Families are very important in Boston. You hire a gang, you hire a family.

[00:33:37] **HOWARD:** Could one of the reasons the reasons the stevedores had a much larger influence in New York than on the West Coast be because the maritime operators were smaller and didn't want to take on the responsibilities themselves of recruiting labor. Whereas, on the West Coast, you have three or four major shipping operators, it might behoove them to bring in the stevedore operators in their own firm.

[00:34:00] **STANLEY:** Let's dig a bit. In all probably, the American steamship companies on the East Coast was every bit as big, or larger, than on the West Coast. Waterman [Waterman Steamship Corporation] , U.S. Lines [United States Lines] , Delta Lines [Delta Steamship Lines] , McCormick [Moore-McCormack Lines] , and others. The Port of New York handled as much tonnage as the entirety of the West Coast. At one point, you could almost say it was as much as the West Coast and the rest of the ports on the East Coast combined. Into New York are coming maybe 10 or 15 times as many foreign steamships as on the West Coast. Each one has to hire longshore hands. Cost plus. Who is sailing into these ports? On the West Coast—China? Not much from China. Russia? Not much there. Japan is the only large maritime country in the Pacific Basin. The Port of New York has a collection of stevedoring, employs maritime contractors, you can play off, make deals with, find a lot of tiers. You can make a separate deal with a foreign ship. A Greek, he's paying less than a Liberian. A French ship is paying a little more than an Italian. A limejuicer [British ship] is paying through the nose versus a German ship. You could play around with prices and sustain themselves as a stevedoring employer.

[00:36:12] **HOWARD:** Hmm, ok. That would make sense then. So it may not be the size, per se, of the shipping operators.

[00:36:21] **STANLEY:** It may not be the size of the American operators, but the multiplicity of operators of all the maritime countries that are sending their ships into the East Coast ports.

[00:36:34] **HOWARD:** Ok. Yeah, that makes some sense. It also might explain the conditions of racketeering. Why it was so prevalent.

[00:36:42] **STANLEY:** Yeah, it fits into that.

[00:36:44] **HOWARD:** Yeah.

[00:36:45] **STANLEY:** Want more water?

[00:36:46] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I would. Thank you.

[BREAK IN RECORDING OF INTERVIEW]

This is shifting gears a lot. I know your view of Bridges doesn't at all fit into my proposal! The durability of radical leadership. You would argue, I suspect, that he wasn't radical. He hasn't been radical for years. What's your assessment of Bridges, I guess, is what I'm asking.

[00:37:15] **STANLEY:** Let's—let me be more specific. Bridges was very radical in the '34 strike. You have to understand the history of Stalinism. The Third Period of Stalinism, officially called the Third Period by historians, probably still is, was their ultra-left period. That period ended in 1935. Thereupon we had the Popular Front [coalition of different political groupings] period, where communists could join the Democratic Party, and you couldn't tell a liberal from a CP. Already in 1936 Bridges was disciplining his own membership. Discouraging job actions and so on. Playing a very conservative role.

[00:38:17] **HOWARD:** How aggressively was he disciplining them? Because they [job actions] were going on all the time, through '37 at least, right?

[00:38:23] **STANLEY:** They were going on through 1940, '41. There's such a thing as a work stoppage that's unofficial, which is discouraged by the leadership of the union. You do not obtain what you are going after officially; you show your strength, but you don't get it. During the Hitler-Stalin Pact [Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,] , when the CP turned to the left again, you have more job actions, condoned by the officialdom, in that period than in the previous three or four years.

[00:39:12] **HOWARD:** That's, what, '38-'41?

[00:39:16] **STANLEY:** No, '39 and '40.

[00:39:21] **HOWARD:** You're saying there were more job actions there than there were—

[00:39:23] **STANLEY:** There were more job actions condoned by the leadership in that period. It was in '39 and '40 that finally total control of the hiring hall in San Francisco. It was at that point that the dispatchers. . . [pause] I'm trying to go back here. . . The dispatchers won the right to be elected fairly and to support—see, I've forgotten the precise. . . Arbitration was won as a result of a job action. The job dispatchers really got tremendous power as of 1939, in effect making joint control of the hiring hall meaningless. It became really a totally union hiring hall.

[00:40:28] **HOWARD:** My impression was that it was always a meaningless expression to talk about joint control, even after '34.

[00:40:34] **STANLEY:** Well, it became very meaningful in the fifties again.

[00:40:38] **HOWARD:** Yeah.

[00:40:40] **STANLEY:** But after the '34 war [strike] , you still had a lack of union power in the hall in a number of ways. For example, 'Frisco was on a plug system. You could play games with a plug system. You could play favoritism in any direction. The low-man-out system was invented in San Pedro. It wasn't until 1949 that 'Frisco sent a delegation to go learn how these guys work low-man system.

[00:41:23] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[00:41:24] **STANLEY:** And institute it up there.

[00:41:28] **HOWARD:** That's interesting. I didn't know that.

[00:41:30] **STANLEY:** This is the most inventive port in the coast. Democratically.

[00:41:35] **HOWARD:** What do you attribute that to? Do you have any ideas?

[00:41:38] **STANLEY:** Two major hypotheses that dovetail. One, the influence of the Wobblies. That whole background and subculture. Two, Los Angeles is a screwball place. A lot of new ideas come out of screwball southern California. More inventive, more experimental. Whereas the port is isolated, you can't separate this port totally from the northern city.

Figure it out. Read, Southern California Country [by] Carey McWilliams and you find out that Compton [California] , right here, where a lot of longshoremen live, was the birthplace of Bellamy Clubs [Nationalist Clubs that sought to relieve social inequality through nationalization of industry] . Early on. Turn of the century. After the debacle of the [Los Angeles] Times bombing , at a time when the whole central labor body was Socialist in this town, they went dormant for a while. [clock chiming] But then in the depth of the Depression, those same Bellamy Clubs sprang up again as production-for-use clubs, co-ops. Self-help. He says something like the following, that the people involved were getting 75 percent of their food needs out of these co-ops because they could down here and pick all these surpluses. They thereupon became the EPIC ["End Poverty in California"] clubs of Upton Sinclair, the same old Bellamy Clubs. That's part of something that's near the port here. It may have an effect or made a contribution. That sort of thing, that's southern California, isn't it? This screwball inventiveness, the great I am, Aimee Semple McPherson. Not fearful about being idiosyncratic and experimental.

[00:44:08] **HOWARD:** It's interesting because the more I've done reading on this stuff, the more I begin to see that the Wobblies cannot simply be dismissed by any means. Most writers have tended to dismiss them as, "well, they lacked permanent organization," or "they had very little ideological impact on the working class."

[00:44:22] **STANLEY:** Sub-culturally, they were the most effective people going.

[00:44:25] **HOWARD:** I think so. I really do.

[00:44:27] **STANLEY:** When I was a kid in this scab town in East L.A., when I went around the boxcars, I'd see T-bone Slim [Matti Valentin Huhta, IWW poet and activist] sayings. I knew who T-Bone Slim was when I was eight years old! I didn't know he was a Wobbly. I remember I read on a boxcar, maybe six boxcars, at least three, "When introduced to injustice, the proper response [form of politeness] is attack."

[00:44:57] **HOWARD:** I saw it up in your room there, yeah!

[00:44:59] **STANLEY:** T-Bone Slim. When I saw that in print in conjunction with surrealism and Wobblies, I fell out.

There was another one, [?S. B. King?] . Most elaborate signature, in chalk on all the boxcars. His sayings. They captured the imagination of people. Unionism wasn't just something that you had to put up another bureaucracy. Go out and get something real. They were here.

[00:45:39] **HOWARD:** That's interesting. [phone rings] Sure. [to Stanley about answering the call]

[BREAK IN THE REOCORDING OF THE INTERVIEW]

I wanted to ask you now about the people who come after the Wobblies, to the extent that they were radical during the Third Period at least. The Marine Workers Industrial Union, the CP, dual union. Do you have any sense of what kind of ideological organizational impact they had along the waterfront? And why they were able to displace the Wobblies?

[00:46:11] **STANLEY:** I wasn't on the waterfront; I was too young. I only know this through—I came on the waterfront in 1941. There were a lot of old-timers. I met guys who'd been in the MWIU. I can't give you a first-rate kind of response. I think that they probably had a large impact in that period. Particularly from '32-'35, those three years. For example, I was also an autoworker. I was in a local run by guys who'd been in the CP. They were still living in the '40s off of reputations they'd built prior to '36. The kind of guys who had reputations, stories told about them afterwards. Heard a story told in 1946 about a guy named Jack, who by this time was on the International staff. When he was steward of the year, he had holes in his shoes. He's come in the pub. "Is anything wrong?" You said, "No." He'd say, "Make something [wrong] !"

[00:47:35] **HOWARD:** [laughing]

[00:47:36] **STANLEY:** In the Third Period, the workers that they recruited, they released them to utilized on the job all the goddamn ultra-leftist and antagonism that they felt for the system. As they experienced it at work. Which is where American workers are really radical. They're anti-capitalist in relation to their own employer. Outside, and away from the job, they'll go along with the Democratic Party and so on. The CP fitted exactly the strangeness of American workers.

[00:48:20] **HOWARD:** I never thought about that.

[00:48:21] **STANLEY:** Political on the job, radical on the job. Off the job, [inaudible] politically and fairly conservative.

[00:48:31] **HOWARD:** Though they even compromise in politics on the job after '35 though, right?

[00:48:36] **STANLEY:** After '35, yes. Up until '35, they couldn't shut off these guys right away. They had to discipline them, and a lot of them left. It was a revolving door in and out of the Party. In those years, those guys were loud. Acted like Wobblies.

[00:48:57] **HOWARD:** Why would they have been able to displace the Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union, which was the Wobbly organization? Was that just through oppression that was directed towards the Wobblies during the '20s?

[00:49:06] **STANLEY:** There wasn't much left of them, as a formal organization. That was pretty much gone in '23.

[00:49:14] **HOWARD:** So the CP basically filled the void then?

[00:49:17] **STANLEY:** Yeah. A vacuum. Just like the CP filled the void in 1919. Demoralization among radical intellectuals and Wobblies and Socialists, as a result of the war and the Second International [socialist and labor parties formed Socialist International 1889-1916] . Matter of fact, American radicals made their own contribution to the bureaucratization of Communist International. They didn't go to Lenin cause of his enthusiasm, they [CP] filled the vacuum. Paul [?Buel?] studies the way this happened.

[BREAK IN RECORDING OF INTERVIEW]

[00:49:59] **HOWARD:** Sure. Ok, the next set of questions concerns the '34 strike. How would you characterize that? In other words, was it simply aggressive, trade union kinds of demands? Was there something more involved? Was there something more than what appeared to be on the surface? Which superficially were union recognition and things like that, the hiring hall. It certainly went beyond the original union demands. I'm just getting a sense of how would you characterize it.

[00:50:26] **STANLEY:** All the '34 that I knew were merchant seaman. That I knew intimately. These are guys in the Sailors Union of the Pacific [SUP] , cause I was a deckhand. The sailors union had all the West Coast ships deckhands. The Marine Water Tenders and Wipers [Pacific Coast Marine Firemen, Oilers, Water Tenders, and Wipers Association] had the Black gang. Marine Cooks and Stewards had the stewards. That division. The water tenders were recommending striking already, just before the '34 strike. It was their revolution. They didn't talk about it in terms of how to control society; they talked about it in terms of taking control of their society. They were nostalgic about it. They thought about it like it was something very special and societal for them, in their community. As they saw it bureaucratize, it literally broke their hearts. Some of them became alcoholics on the basis of bureaucratization in the union as they saw it occur. Heartbroken. "Look at what's happened to Harry,"--meaning Lundeborg. "I can't stand it, Red." I was red-headed in those days. "It's killing me." Talk about—they drilled me with history of the strike on an 11-month trip at sea. My first trip to sea, 11 months. The first two months, "Joe, this is what happened in '34. This were the issues. This is the arbitration award. This is what we did." Boom, boom, boom. After that, they'd quiz me! "What happened on July the fifth?"

[00:52:14] **HOWARD:** [laughing] That's incredible.

[00:52:14] **STANLEY:** What that amounted to is history lessons. Nightly.

[00:52:19] **HOWARD:** Political socialization.

[00:52:20] **STANLEY:** As they were teaching me splices.

[00:52:24] **HOWARD:** It's just so hard to imagine. The unions that I've been in. I guess they are radically different than they were in the thirties.

[00:52:31] **STANLEY:** By 1945 or so, the sailors union was more like unions today than then. Because those guys are atomized. Split up. Watered down. Those old timers. Those guys saw '34 as their tog [their mantle] . A millennium. Their time. Unfortunately, there was some naïveté there. The '34 award contained a massive juker

[fake out] contained the seeds of the destruction of the union. Here are all these wonderful plums before the '34 war. The '34 award stated, "the employer can now introduce labor-saving devices at will."

[00:53:25] **HOWARD:** Unless they jeopardize safety of the crew, wasn't it?

[00:53:30] **STANLEY:** That wasn't stated during '34 award, the safety thing. Just labor-saving devices. Before the '34 war.

Now, one of the things that the MWIU made its reputation on was the resistance to the plasterboard, the lift board, and the four wheeler.

[00:53:53] **HOWARD:** Four-wheeler being what?

[00:53:58] **STANLEY:** When longshore was really labor-intensive, and it was labor-intensive because of the two-wheel hand truck.

[00:54:05] **HOWARD:** Ok, I've seen those. I've worked those. A pain in the butt. [laughs]

[00:54:07] **STANLEY:** Guys running up and down and all over. With the liftboard, with bridles—a bridle and then a bridle here—you could put it on a board so that the board was like this. You got this bar here, like this, and coming up here and up here—you got a four-wheel wagon, like this, with a ton here that attached to another four-wheel wagon. You can have a jitney pulling all these wagons. You can drive four wagons on the end of the hook. This one under here, put a header here—so you're knocking out all the. . . The MWIU really resisted this and led fights against it.

[00:54:57] **HOWARD:** This would be less strenuous physically, though. It just would knock out employment. Is that what you're saying?

[00:55:02] **STANLEY:** It was less strenuous physically because no one was pushing this stuff from here to there, plus it was being dragged by an engine, this jitney, and you could get so much more on it. So it was really a labor-saving device. Then in World War II came the forklift. The union couldn't resist that. Because the pattern was already set up. [clock chiming] That is, when this comes in, "Alright, we're saving jobs. Give us a cut of the pie". If we say, "Enough," they're going to say, "You're jeopardizing the '34 war. Because, all the good things about the '34 war, you're going to fight this? '34 war took you there." And when it becomes worse, the same answer. So the trap is wide open for containerization. And when the containers came, the union takes the same stance, but this is the end of the application.

[00:56:08] **HOWARD:** But the only problem—Bridges' response would be, well, the men want to get away from onerous work. No one romanticized the oppressive working conditions that existed in the early '30s. Any technological innovation that made work less burdensome was a step in the right direction.

[00:56:31] **STANLEY:** That's inaccurate.

[00:56:33] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[00:56:36] **STANLEY:** Historically, it didn't come that way. Bridges did a lot in the headquarters port. That was not the case here, in this port. The headquarters port we'll talk about. In San Francisco, the largest port, then not now, on the coast. To shut the door to recruiting new people in the '50s. So that by the time you get to 1957, the average age of the San Francisco registered longshoremen was 56. Where the union members in the hold were

by and large casuals recruited from warehouse, there and other unions. The prerequisite retained, the setup that was in the M&M Agreement, you had to have a B-list. So they recruited all these young men to work in the hold only. These young men became the cadre hold workers. They work under the jurisdiction of the union; they're not allowed to join the union.

[00:57:59] **HOWARD:** Was that the probationary period?

[00:58:04] **STANLEY:** You could stay in B status, so far as you knew, forever.

[00:58:07] **HOWARD:** Until they opened up more registering.

[00:58:09] **STANLEY:** Yeah, until they did. You didn't know. You were promised, 'yes, within a year.' It became two, became three, became four. When Bridges made his argument in '60, the argument that you just made, that they were eliminating the sweat of longshoremen—back then, he made the argument, but it fell on deaf ears as far as the A-men who were going to vote on the contract because they were already working on the dock and on deck. They already had easy jobs. The B-men couldn't vote. They knew it wasn't going to take the sweat out of longshoremen for a long time because there still is only one container ship on the whole coast in 1959, or '56. They're still working with bulk cargo, and they're going to be working for a long time. And they did work it, the majority until '67, '68. So it was a decade of paid work that was still break bulk. As a matter of fact, it put the sweat into longshoremen by eliminating the sling load limit. They pulled up 2100-pound loads, and, suddenly into the hatch comes 40—

[END PART TWO/BEGIN PART THREE]

[Hugh Downs interview with Harry Bridges on "Over Easy" television program, March 25, 1981 from Part 3 01:00:41 through 01:11:41]

[RETURN TO STANLEY WEIR INTERVIEW RECORDING]

A lot of the work in the port in 1959 and '60 was at the [inaudible] terminals, which was mainly pineapple from the islands. In cases. Weighing approximately 42 pounds, something like that. Maybe a little bit more, maybe a little bit less, depending on the size of the cans and the cart. If you're loading up that kind of cargo, you build loads, standing on the dock, of 2,100 pounds, it's roughly 24 cases. Or you're taking that many off. The more the hook travels, even now, the more rest you get between loads. The bigger the loads, the less travel of the hook, the less rest.

[01:11:39] **HOWARD:** Why would the size of the load reduce the travel of the hook?

[01:11:41] **STANLEY:** If I've got 24 cases in a pallet, if we take the 24 cases off and stow them, we take a four-wheeler out and then square them and send the empty out. You have to stand there waiting until the hook goes out and gets another case and brings a pallet back in. But if that board comes in at 48 instead of 24 cases, they can keep us right at it twice as long.

Plus, they brought in, the first day of the M&M Agreement—I was working then, you know—they brought in a load that had approximately 4,800 pounds. It was so high that it wouldn't go underneath the coaming in between deck, and so we had to skim three layers of cartons off the top of every load just get it into the wing. So heavy that it was going through the hatch boards, and we had to put down steel plates in order that the four-wheeler didn't go through the hatch boards into the lower hold. In some cases, it did.

[01:12:52] **HOWARD:** That was the first day of the M&M Agreement? It must have been demoralizing.

[01:12:57] **STANLEY:** Plus, in that skimming off, you gotta reach up and pull all that stuff down, and carry it and belly pack it and place it around. As a matter of fact, you're working four and four, you couldn't push that load in. You had to tell the guys, "Come over and help us push this in our wing, and we'll help you push yours into your wing." I mean, the work got bad. It really got onerous.

[01:13:31] **HOWARD:** But ultimately the containerization became more of a force, the physical labor expending in longshoring was reduced, wasn't it?

[01:13:32] **STANLEY:** Yes, ultimately. We paid—we capitalized those containers by giving up the work rules. The increase in productivity as a result of the integration of work rules created the profit that bought the containers. Then when they screw us, they made us fund their new program.

[01:14:03] **HOWARD:** Now, the L.A. port was the only that I know of that voted against the M&M Agreement.

[01:14:07] **STANLEY:** The first one.

[01:14:09] **HOWARD:** The first M&M Agreement, yeah. What happened the second time?

[01:14:13] **STANLEY:** The second time, there was more opposition. It was a higher vote against it.

[01:14:23] **HOWARD:** The majority went with it, why?

[01:14:24] **STANLEY:** Still the majority went with it. By giving up the work rules, there're still B-men. The B-men are still in the hold without a union. The quid pro quo [give and take] was, for the first M&M, that 7900 dollar bonus on retirement in one lump sum or you can retire three years earlier, at age 62, and utilize the \$7,900 as your pension for that three years. A grandfathered agreement. The old timers. Also in the M&M agreement, it said that only those registered as of 1959 could ever get this. So if I was made an A-man in 1962, even though I'm an A-man now, I don't get this bonus. Now the second M&M agreement, the bribery went up to \$13,600 bonus. Just enough. Let's think it, \$13,000 in 1965—

[01:15:30] **HOWARD:** That's very attractive money. So you think it's essentially that they were making a very attractive offer to the people who were eligible to vote in their own material interest.

[01:15:44] **STANLEY:** Plus, I'm talking about the waterfront public. Containerization, what it really was, never became a public issue for discussion and debate within the union. That is, no one realized that this would go as far—well, a few did. A few did. Bridges knew but he didn't tell anybody. And really what we didn't understand was the totality of it. Once you install these cranes and have all these boxes, then you can computerize it very easily. So that now with the new system being Morgan Cranes which was a pilot project in Richmond and now is on Terminal Island full-scale, not in operation quite yet. They set up three football fields, and two of them, they put sensors in the black-top. So, you sit in the crane, you push two buttons, go down to the right aisle. Go down that aisle, and pick up that one.

[01:17:02] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[01:17:06] **STANLEY:** You've got a mousetrap at the edge of the dock. By gravity these things just feed into where the hook puts them into the hold in slots.

[01:17:14] **HOWARD:** Wow.

[01:17:17] **STANLEY:** So we're gonna wind up on this port with 300 longshoremen. . .

[01:17:22] **HOWARD:** I remember Bridges once made a statement that if total automation took effect, and there was only one worker left to push the buttons, that one worker would have the greatest retirement benefits that any union'd ever given them. It looks like it's headed in that direction.

Before we get to that, the question of mechanization, I want to pick up some of this other stuff about Bridges' role in the '34 strike. That's been told extensively by most people. Do you have anything you want to add about what you think his role was in that strike, and how critical his role was? Or how important his—

[01:17:59] **STANLEY:** I'm a victim of all of the myths. I've heard it all the myths about his great leadership. Certainly, there must be some substance one tends always to miss. However, there are other hypotheses. In most periods of accelerated social change, the real heroes are people who want only temporary involvement. Particularly Americans are like this. [?Sid Mins?] talks about this. They get hotter and heavier and doing terribly radical things in the Midwest in '36, '37. The guy is the hero of the strike, and when the strike is over, he disappears into the woodwork. You never hear from him. He doesn't remain as a leader. Administrative types then takeover.

If Bridges has a real skill, it's as an administrator. The guy will sit through the longest meetings and not be out-waited. The rank-and-file will vote with its feet. But Bridges is the type to sit on and on and stay till one, two in the morning, to the last vote with also great administrative and rhetorical skills.

I have asked '34 men, "What was Bridges' role [in the '34 strike]?" One guy with great authority on the waterfront said to me, "The real hero of the '34 strike in San Francisco was Dirty Nick White." I said, "Who the hell was Dirty Nick White?" "He was a guy." I said, "What did he do?" He said, he was the most courageous guy he ever met. He'd run up the gangway of a ship full of scabs, with all of them swinging at him with 2x4s, and grabbed one of them, and pulled him off, and bring him down, and beat the hell out of him. And get other guys to go up the gangway and do the same. "He was a fiery speaker, and he was a hero in every way. And we'd follow him because he gave us courage, and he didn't think he was any better than us. He was one of us."

Another guy tells me one of the guys that testified against Bridges in the deportation was an Aussie [Australian], like Bridges, and I knew him as a gang boss. He was an alcoholic after having testified against Bridges. He testified against Bridges in a strange way. He named no names, and he only testified against the [inaudible] of the Party. He was known—stories about him were the same was with Dirty Nick White tremendous feeling, great in action, he just didn't want to sit through all those meetings. But when they were done, that's the end of it.

I think the truth probably lies somewhere between these two approaches. That is that spontaneously out of the subculture came these heroes, and that they were the real shock group leaders. But that they guys that are going to preside and the powers afterwards were the administrative types. Because throughout all American labor, there was great creativity in the early '30s and as soon as the contracts get signed, the bureaucratization of the early '30s begins. That is, John L. Lewis [labor leader] did not create industrial unions in the United States. Auto workers, rubber workers, and electrical workers created industrial unions in the United States. John L. in 1935 said, "Jesus Christ, look what they're doing by themselves—creating industrial unions. The guy who brings a loop over all that, Mr. Big, it's going to be me." The Lewis CIO [Committee for Industrial Organization, later Congress of Industrial Organizations] period is the period where creativity gets stifled. Read *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy* by [Clinton S.] Golden and [Harold J.] Guttenberg—

[01:22:27] **HOWARD:** I've seen that.

[01:22:28] **STANLEY:** They were very frank. They were steel worker leaders. They said, “There’s militants in every union, and we had to discipline them.” The dynamic of that process that is in The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy, I think, operate on the waterfront as well. See, Bridges had something else. Bridges has in the ‘40s a built-in cadre of CP, without himself being CP or under the discipline of the Party. Now he is automatically media. If he farts, it makes the press. If he belches, it gets a headline. He was absolutely conservative on the waterfront, but in public he continually makes these statements that are pro-Soviet Union.

[01:23:31] **HOWARD:** What period are we talking about now?

[01:23:34] **STANLEY:** Whenever.

[01:23:34] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[01:23:38] **STANLEY:** As a result, the press calls him “radical.” He was conservative in the industry.

[01:23:45] **HOWARD:** Even before ’37, ’38? You would characterize him as conservative in the industry?

[01:23:49] **STANLEY:** I’d say, as of ’36 he was a conservative.

[01:23:52] **HOWARD:** When they signed the agreement in ’36.

[01:23:54] **STANLEY:** Uh-huh.

[01:23:58] **HOWARD:** What makes him conservative? The fact that he signed the contract with employers? I mean the alternative is there’s no contracts at all going back to the syndicalists.

[01:24:07] **STANLEY:** I think that Bridges is a victim. Like [Walter P.] Reuther, like Homer Martin, all of them. Like Mike Quill. If you want a contract, if you sign a contract which doesn’t allow you to strike during the term of the contract, you’ve lost your power to win grievances during the life of the contract. You’re sure to find out, then, that the only way that you can get any concessions out of the ranks is by becoming a disciplinarian. If you discipline the ranks, of course, we’ll make concessions to them, but only through you. You want something? Keep the lid on it down there, and you can have this.” That creates a gap between the ranks and the leadership automatically, the nature of collective bargaining.

[01:25:05] **HOWARD:** What employer though would realistically enter into a contract with a union representative when the union representative when the union representative pays out the possibility of striking during the middle of the contract, if they don’t like the way things are going? They’ll say, “Look, we’re going agree to these terms. Everyone agrees that these are the legitimate basis of operation during the term of the contract. If we can’t agree to it, then we’ll go to an arbitrator.” I understand what you’re saying, but I’m just wondering how feasible the alternative is that you’re talking about.

[01:25:29] **STANLEY:** About 1 percent of the contracts in this country are still contracts that you can strike under.

[01:25:35] **HOWARD:** Who holds those, do you know? Who holds those?

[01:25:38] **STANLEY:** Some—Oakland scavengers, for one. Local 70 has maybe a dozen sub-locals.

[01:25:47] **HOWARD:** They were constructed of the course of—?

[01:25:48] **STANLEY:** Yeah. In the '30s, most contracts did not have an arbitration clause. Whereas it said, "There should be no strikes or lockouts during the term of this agreement," there was not the language to enforce that. You could pull a job action and get away with it. But the "No Strikes" statement was the beginning of the dynamic that made conservatives out of the officials. Bridges is not the villain. Bridges was victim of, Mike Quill [founder of Transport Workers Union of America] is the victim of, Walter Reuther [labor leader of United Automobile Workers] is the victim of a structure in the collective bargaining that automatically separates you from the rank and file. Now, the crime of Bridges is that he not only was forced to do this but willingly goes overboard to do it.

[01:26:48] **HOWARD:** After '48? Right? Even before then, though?

[01:26:53] **STANLEY:** The reason why the employer would become human relations instead of scientific management after '48 was because of the willingness that he showed to play this role before '48. The '48 strike was forced upon Bridges. The employers finally woke up and said, "Look, this guy wants it." As a matter of fact, Paul St. Sure talks about this. Paul St. Sure says, "I would convince the waterfront employer to collaborate with Bridges." And he would go uptown and have lunch with an uptown employer. That subculture was so strong that the guy'd come back from lunch and say, "I can't do it." For years, that went on. '48 was the breaking point.

But look at during World War II—Bridges came up with the idea that the real enemy was the militant worker. Because the militant worker would jeopardize the war effort in Russia for his own selfish interests. Bridges warned the Committee of Maritime Unions [CIO Maritime Committee] with Joe Curran [founder of the National Maritime Union] on that basis and gave the CP its line.

[01:28:07] **HOWARD:** I thought that was formed after the war?

[01:28:08] **STANLEY:** It was after the war, but it was an extension of his no strike attitude forever. That is, Bridges said, "Strikes are passé. I'm for no strike at least for nine years after the war because the militants are going to screw up and are going to hurt our ability to openly trade with Russia and China."

[01:28:30] **HOWARD:** He actually said that?

[01:28:31] **STANLEY:** Yes.

[01:28:32] **HOWARD:** Where? If he did, I would love to see it, if that's in fact the case. I've never even actually seen where he said he wanted to extend the no strikes pledge. There was one brief reference in the proceedings of the union at the end of the war. But he doesn't give that unconditionally there. He's saying, "That's only if the employers guarantee our union security after the war."

[01:28:54] **STANLEY:** It was so commonly around, statements that he made like that, during the war—

[01:28:59] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[01:29:01] **STANLEY:** Christ, it never occurred to me that anyone would ever challenge it.

[01:29:08] **HOWARD:** Hmm.

[01:29:09] **STANLEY:** When the Oakland general strike broke out, for Christ's sake, three gangs walked off the ships on the Army base. He replaced them immediately with more gangs.

[01:29:18] **HOWARD:** When was that? What year, do you know?

[01:29:20] **STANLEY:** December '46.

[01:29:21] **HOWARD:** December '46, hmm, it's after the war, too.

[01:29:26] **STANLEY:** Just. The Oakland general strike was really an extension of the '46 strike. The same frustration with having given away so much during the war. Just suddenly released energy.

[END PART THREE/BEGIN PART FOUR]

You had the cohesiveness that had built up amongst informal workers during the war in war industry.

[01:29:58] **HOWARD:** Ok, so there was a period of three, four, five years—

[01:30:01] **STANLEY:** Four years. Where that could develop. Now with then those strike pledges rescinded, they were free to act. They did. Then comes reconversion to peacetime industry. That plays confetti one more time with the labor force in this country. Here they are. Now they've been here for five years, warriors like this. They got there by confetti process four years earlier. Now they're getting some cohesiveness and some history of their own. Confetti again. And they land in different combinations all around the country again.

[01:30:47] **HOWARD:** How extensive was that? I never even thought about that, actually.

[01:30:49] **STANLEY:** How extensive was what?

[01:30:50] **HOWARD:** The conversion from military to peacetime production?

[01:30:53] **STANLEY:** It was as big a miracle as our gearing for war.

[01:30:58] **HOWARD:** Was it really?

[01:30:59] **STANLEY:** You'd never seen like how we geared for war. Overnight! Imagine—here's a shipyard right here in [San] Pedro, in Wilmington [California] . 30,000 workers. One ship a day, 30 ways. Imagine. They laid off all but about 900 workers in one week.

[01:31:25] **HOWARD:** Wow. That is phenomenal.

[01:31:30] **STANLEY:** There were people walking around here, like this. "What happened?"

[01:31:34] **HOWARD:** Dazed.

[01:31:38] **STANLEY:** Imagine all the radicals in the wartime industries, been building things up. The Shachtmanites [Marxists influenced by Max Shachtman] here in San Pedro put out 12,000 copies of Labor Action [Marxist newspaper] a week in the shipyard. 12,000. They devoted themselves night and day for four years, and then [snaps fingers] it was gone. Think to what it did to them as radicals.

[01:32:05] **HOWARD:** It also makes quite plausible why the purge could go on in '47 as easily as it did.

[01:32:12] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[01:32:12] **HOWARD:** That's interesting.

[01:32:12] **STANLEY:** Good point.

[01:32:15] **HOWARD:** It's very interesting.

I know you were on the East Coast. You wrote in one of your articles that you saw the longshore scene in the East Coast firsthand. Very poignant tale you had to tell. What about [Joseph] Ryan? Any sense of the kind of relationships that he had with the men? I've read some stuff, and it generally all gives the same account. That Ryan—

[01:32:44] **STANLEY:** Well, to compare Ryan and Bridges is really difficult and, I think, misleading. Ryan represents a generation prior to Bridges. Remember, Ryan ran this longshore union here on this coast. Finking Joe was driven off this coast under threat of death from the rank and file. "Don't ever come back." It's Local 110 and Local 1-13 of the ILWU because it was District 1 ILA. The first convention of the ILWU is 1937, when it disaffiliates from them and goes independent CIO.

Joe Ryan represents all the old, pre-'30 graft and simple corruption. Business union corruption. Far more interesting and better to compare Bridges and Lundeberg or Bridges and Joe Curran. Curran is contemporary. He comes out of the 30s, too. Lundeberg comes out of the 30s. Lundeberg, an ex-Wob. Lundeberg becomes straight business unionist. So does Curran after a bad experience with the Party. Lundeberg was in the Party.

[01:34:31] **HOWARD:** Lundeberg was?

[01:34:33] **STANLEY:** No. He was cheating them out of dues.

The split between Bridges and Lundeberg isn't a simple ideological split. Norma Perry is the key to understanding much of the split. Norma Perry is a very attractive, sexy broad who's got a mind that's like a steel trap and an ace negotiator and a CP-er. Bridges' girlfriend. Lundeberg steals her from Bridges.

[01:35:03] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[01:35:05] **STANLEY:** Known as the Iron Cunt. All over the waterfront. [clock chimes]

[01:35:14] **HOWARD:** [laughing]

[01:35:14] **STANLEY:** And she wound up in this port.

[01:35:15] **HOWARD:** I've never heard that. There's a whole dissertation written on Lundeberg and Bridges. That may be the answer.

[01:35:24] **STANLEY:** But I want to go back. The arrangement. If I'm Bridges, I'm a conservative on the job, but I'll make "radical statements" about Russia in public. The CP will support me on the job because of it.

[01:35:50] **HOWARD:** What does that support constitute?

[01:35:54] **STANLEY:** Every meeting, I got 12-50 guys who'll hit the mic for me who are articulate rhetoricians. Who'll stay up all night, and who'll make 75 phone calls.

[01:36:09] **HOWARD:** So you're suggesting, if I read you correctly, that Bridges' support, to the extent that there was support, wasn't really ideological support as much as it was his ability to organizationally dominate the union.

[01:36:22] **STANLEY:** Ideological support in that he was getting very sophisticated group, relatively speaking, to support him within the union.

[01:36:31] **HOWARD:** A handful of CP-ers, essentially, right? Close friends.

[01:36:34] **STANLEY:** Yeah. And uptown, all the liberal CP-ers are giving me good press.

[01:36:42] **HOWARD:** But presumably the workers would be able to see through that, would they not?

[01:36:46] **STANLEY:** Their attitude was, this is one of the things I'm after, his MO [modus operandi]. Ok, let him make all the speeches uptown, as long as he's honest down here. See, one of the big things about Bridges was he wasn't going to steal. His bag wasn't money. Honest guy that way. These guys had been robbed blind by the ILA. Here's an honest guy—that's oversimplification.

It's the same arrangement Doug Fraser has with DSOC [Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee] today. Doug Fraser's absolutely conservative in the union, but he and [William] Winpisinger make all these progressive statements about the whales and the ecology and so on—which is good stuff. We should keep the whales, and all the whales, of all kinds. We gotta do away with our tin cans, littering. Fraser and Winpisinger are, you know, [inaudible] so that Mike Harrington and his whole crowd make it look like here's a great liberal, leftist labor party type force in our society. Whereas on the job level, he's playing a reactionary employer role.

[01:38:09] **HOWARD:** Certainly Fraser is. I don't know about Winpisinger, ok.

[01:38:12] **STANLEY:** And Winpisinger, too. He's standard IAM [International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers] velvet line. He came to power right up through the heart of the velvet. He ain't so progressive when it comes to union issues.

[01:38:28] **HOWARD:** I know, for instance, that he was instrumental in putting one of the locals in receivership that came under control by some radicals once. I do know that. But beyond that—

[01:38:38] **STANLEY:** He'd be right down the line conservative on union issues. But on these societal issues? Well!

[01:38:46] **HOWARD:** But what about the statements that Bridges makes regarding collective bargaining? He makes them publicly, of course—that's the only way I would know about them—and he'll take a line like, "The workers and the employers have nothing in common. We're into class struggle and unionism. We believe that ultimately we have to overthrow society." Is that purely rhetoric? And, if it is, does it have any consequences to the rank and file?

[01:39:06] **STANLEY:** He's so cynical.

[01:39:07] **HOWARD:** I know. I sensed that.

[01:39:10] **STANLEY:** True story. Eyewitness. We had goldfish bowl negotiations in 1968 in San Francisco. Not all of them are goldfish, but some. The ranks could come and sit there, and there are a few of us there in the session. In walks St. Sure was there with his entourage on one side of the table, and here's Bridges and his

group on this side. Bridges immediately begins to say, “Paul, do you think it’d be alright if we did this? Paul, do you think you could. . . ? Paul? Paul?”

[Phone rings] Hello?

[Break in the recording of the interview]

[01:39:51] **HOWARD:** Tell me about Bridges and St. Sure.

[01:39:52] **STANLEY:** St. Sure leaves on a recess. Bill Lawrence, also old CP-er—

[01:40:02] **HOWARD:** He was? I thought he led the opposition to Bridges later on, though?

[01:40:09] **STANLEY:** No. Not flat out. Equivocally. But a real CP-er. Far more Party guy, along with [Louis] Goldblatt than Bridges. As soon as the employers got their own warrants, he looked at Bridges and said, “Jesus Christ, you were sure nice to him!” Bridges didn’t bat an eyelash. He said, “Play-acting. Just play-acting.”

[01:40:38] **HOWARD:** Maybe he was? I don’t know.

[01:40:42] **STANLEY:** They were Frick and Frack [two people with a strong friendship] , for Christ’s sake, Bridges and St. Sure. Making all these speeches around on M&M.

[01:40:49] **HOWARD:** I know, later on there was a great article by [?Paul Jacobs?] . Did you read that? “The Gag Man.”

[01:40:55] **STANLEY:** I wrote that with him.

[01:40:56] **HOWARD:** Did you? It was good. [laugh]

Well, you’re making my research more difficult, talking about the origins of radical leadership. Let me ask you this question, now that we’re here. The reason I’ve talked about the origins of radical leadership is because that was unambiguous presumably. Bridges was identified publicly as a radical; Ryan was a reactionary. What I wanted to do was talk about the origins of radical conservative working class politics. I was reluctant to do so because I don’t know if I can make the case that, in fact, longshoremen were something called “politically radical.” What do you think about that? Do you see the dilemma I’m sort of struggling with?

[01:41:38] **STANLEY:** Well, first of all, the CP did very well in ‘Frisco. Amongst artists and intellectuals. A general strike automatically poses an imposition upon workers. They’re forced to do things that ideologically they have no intention of doing. A friend of mine was in a meeting in the ‘34 strike uptown. He was going to get shot the next day by a teargas pellet, and the [?red?] would puncture his lung. A guy gets up in the middle of this mass meeting at Redmen’s Hall and says, “I move we assassinate the mayor.” And [hits hand on the table] the chair said, “Well, any discussion?” It was a mass meeting with thousands of people. It was that radical a situation [Howard laughs] in the general strike.

“If you go to work, you lose. If you don’t go to work, you’re gonna starve out. You gotta find an alternative; you gotta create an alternative society.” That’s the question posed by a general strike. You had an explosion in the American working class of radicalization. It made it possible for the CP to recruit a lot of those people. It really politicized them.

[01:43:17] **HOWARD:** At least in San Francisco it's conceivable that one could make the argument for a radicalized working class base in the longshore industry.

[01:43:26] **STANLEY:** Yes. And to a lesser extent, even here there was some of that. In the Northwest ports, there was some of that. But not like 'Frisco.

[01:43:35] **HOWARD:** And 'Frisco's largely because of the ambiance of the CP and being a progressive town and everything else.

[01:43:42] **STANLEY:** When you figure that 99 percent of all American workers had turned radical. The Hearst press was telling them where to go and find it. "Fuck that. I'm for revolution. The CP's for revolution? I'll go to the CP." Trotskyites and the Socialists had less than 1 percent of that. Trotskyites didn't have any daily capitalist press telling them that the revolutionaries were the Trotskyites. The CP. . .

[01:44:09] **HOWARD:** It's getting late, so we'll move on to the next one. You've been very generous with your time. I really appreciate this.

The war. Could you just repeat the kinds of comments that you made upstairs regarding the informal work groups? I think I understood them, but I'd just like to hear them one more time if possible.

[01:44:50] **STANLEY:** Let's see here. . . [Turns pages and begins reading]

"Although many of the informal work groups were, technically speaking, broken up in this manner, it's likely that social relations among the men were largely intact because these social relations were not completely severed."

It sounds like, when you read this, as if the informal work groups were pretty much broken up and remained kind of fractured during the war. Then they reformed after the war was over. If we use the term "informal work group" in the way that [George C.] Homans uses it, the informal work groups never cease to exist on the job. They're always there. It's that experienced elements within these groups were taken out of the groups during the war. The same people never came right back into those groups. Veterans returned to jobs and so on, but they didn't find themselves in the same place in the plant or on the waterfront as before. Or, even if they found themselves in the very same department, the very same people, they weren't the same people anymore because they had four years of different experience. The informal work groups were there; they reconstituted a cohesiveness after the war.

You could see it happening by 1950/51. You begin to see the first documentary evidence that the groups had gotten their act together in the one day convention of the steel workers, 1950/51. One day, January second. The secondary leadership in the convention's getting up and saying to [Philip] Murray and [David J.] McDonald, "Hey, they're giving us hell. You don't have to take it. We have to go out and face it. Unless you can give us more, just keep the lid on down here, we're going to have to do something about you." They don't say it that way, but that's implicit in what they say.

In 1955, the General Motors [GM] workers strike. 90 percent against the contract that Reuther just negotiated. In 1958, three years later, not only did the GM workers do the same thing, but the Ford [Ford Motor Company] workers come out in their support. In 1961, it happens even more effectively. So that by the time you get to 1967 special bargaining convention, COBO Hall, April 22-23, you got the ranks coming in for their traditional demonstration in the middle of the convention. I was there. 2,000 guys doing it. Not one sign they carry is for economics and wages. The most popular sign in the whole bunch is "Working Conditions First." The second

most popular was “Dignity Now!” The biggest sign—Reuther gave the back wall on the balcony to the banners from the ranks. He took the other three walls. The ranks had a big sign which was “Shop Floor Representation. Ratio Management one to five. Ration Union one to 250, arrange a portion thereof. Equalized.” They did everything in their power to make Reuther respond to their desire to get control over line speed. Wouldn’t do it. They were together again. Groups had obtained a cohesiveness again. But the groups are always there. We’ve got an informal workgroup in the automobile line today. Retire them all today, and hire new ones— [hits the table] that’s an informal work group. It just hasn’t got any cohesiveness.

[01:49:26] **HOWARD:** Ok, I hear what you’re saying. That’s a critical difference. [clock chiming]

You make another point in the article that was presented in [Maurice] Zeitlin’s book that the way in which these work groups operated to control the productive process was by being able to draw on common experiences with the union leaders who were just recently from those groups themselves.

[01:49:45] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[01:49:45] **HOWARD:** Now how critical was that relationship? That seems a little bit different dynamic than talking about the structure of the group itself. Because now you’re concerned with not only the group process but its relationship to union leadership.

[01:50:01] **STANLEY:** If we got a union, let’s say after the sit-downs in GM, we go back in and we got a contract and a union. We start working local leaders on a regular basis. Those guys are just out of the shop. Well, we can exploit that pretty damn well for the next three years maybe. But within five years, they’ve been going so long, and they’ve built such a shell around themselves in solidarity, we can’t even get to them.

[01:50:35] **HOWARD:** What about the longshoremen when they have the rotation, right? The limitations of two years in office or something like that?

[01:50:42] **STANLEY:** There again you leave yourself wide open. [pause] You make it look as if somehow this was a big democratic thing. It was, at the local level, but the two year limitation did not apply to the International.

[01:51:04] **HOWARD:** It certainly would make the local leaders more accountable to the rank and file than certainly International officers.

[01:51:11] **STANLEY:** But no one ever got to stay in office long enough to develop a reputation to be able to challenge Bridges.

[01:51:16] **HOWARD:** So how do you deal with those problems? You can’t have it both ways, can you?

[01:51:20] **STANLEY:** You can apply the same kind of ruling to the guys at the top.

[01:51:24] **HOWARD:** To the International? Yeah.

[01:51:27] **STANLEY:** See, it’s like the Yugoslav situation and the workers’ councils. The guys in the shop get to stay in the council for one year. By the time they know the score, they gotta get off again. The Party people can stay in in perpetuity.

[01:51:41] **HOWARD:** Oh, is that right?

[01:51:43] **STANLEY:** Mm-hmm.

[01:51:53] **HOWARD:** Hmm.

I make the argument in there—and I’m not the first one to do so—that on the East Coast the Army comes in and sets up regularized employment situations, on the East Coast to some extent. I argue on the basis of that that this was the beginning of—well, I guess it wouldn’t fit now, would it? Informal work groups? Because informal work groups existed on the East Coast—

[01:52:16] **STANLEY:** Well, in a gang—

[01:52:17] **HOWARD:** The gangs become more regularized.

[01:52:19] **STANLEY:** That certainly, I believe, helped. When the Army came in and helped set up the gang systems on the East Coast, you don’t get the benefit of that immediately. But notice that the situation in longshore in the early 1950s—1951 or 1952, somewhere in there—is when the Teamsters start to go in there. And Bridges is back there. The AFL expels and all this business. It wasn’t just Bridges and the AFL going in there that suddenly got the idea, or because they wanted morality in unionism. It was rank and file developments coming. A question of control. The government always will allow things to go along as long as the lid is on.

I was in Washington, D.C. in 1967. In the Department of Labor I find a guy who’s devoted five years of his life to developing a lawsuit against the UMW [United Mine Workers] and its trusteeships. The Department of Labor is not going to use it. All his work gone for naught, not going to be used. Because, even though [John L.] Lewis is out, Tony Boyle is able to keep the lid on it. By 1969 or ‘70, it became apparent that Boyle couldn’t keep the lid on it, and the Department of Labor grabbed that guy again and utilized all that stuff and went after him.

[01:54:03] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[01:54:04] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[01:54:04] **HOWARD:** Hmm.

Yeah, it’s obvious that Ryan wasn’t keeping the lid on after the war. There were all those wildcats, ‘44, ‘45, ‘46, almost every single year.

[01:54:12] **STANLEY:** By the early fifties, the top level AF of L were trying to get in there. Bridges is trying to see what he can do back there. It’s a response to that, in my opinion, to that cohesiveness that had grown up in the gangs as opposed to every four hour shape-up.

[01:54:40] **HOWARD:** Ok, so I can certainly try to run with that hypothesis.

[01:54:44] **STANLEY:** I think so. That’s a solid one in my opinion.

[01:54:48] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I think it is too. Question is whether I’ll be able to find any kind of data for it or not. Apparently the Army regularized employment, regularized gangs in certain piers but not others—if I could find that out—

[01:55:00] **STANLEY:** Get into the National Academy of Sciences, and you can get that stuff, I’m pretty sure. The National Academy of Sciences Maritime Group did all the studies. Like the [?warrior study?] ?

[01:55:13] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I don't know.

[01:55:15] **STANLEY:** Well, they stick social scientists right on piers and on ships and do these studies. [repeatedly hitting the table] And they've done these studies. It was the Pentagon who really got the thing going. The Pentagon is the one that got the National Academy of Sciences to do these studies.

[01:55:36] **HOWARD:** Where would they be housed?

[01:55:38] **STANLEY:** In the National Academy of Sciences building in Washington, D.C.

[01:55:42] **HOWARD:** Under "maritime" or something like that? Hmm, I had no idea that source even existed.

[01:55:47] **STANLEY:** One of the best sources I ever—

[01:55:47] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[01:55:51] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[01:55:51] **HOWARD:** That sounds real promising.

[01:55:56] **STANLEY:** They're sophisticated.

[01:55:58] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I'm sure they are, right? They had a very immediate interest.

I have some questions about the '48 strike. We've covered it a little bit. Anything you want to add about general impressions?

It's interesting because at the time that they're going in for the strike, it's like 90 percent of the West Coast longshoremen vote for the strike. They also do a referendum on support for [Henry] Wallace, support for the Marshall plan, and things like that. And about 60 percent of the workers take progressive stands on each of those issues. Which would seem to indicate that there's some kind of politicization that's continuing in that union, despite the war and everything else.

[01:56:46] **STANLEY:** Well, I don't know. There was certainly a liberalization within the longshore union, just as there was in Czechoslovakia in '68. With the Wallace movement. I think that maybe one of the reasons why Bridges pulled back from the Wallace movement was because it was allowing too much liberalization. Relaxation of work norms in Hungary sets off '56. The Wallace movement may have played that role in the longshore. I don't know; that's real speculation. That's hunch stuff. But I think it's pretty good hunch stuff.

[01:57:46] **HOWARD:** And your analysis of the '48 settlement is essentially that it wasn't so much a union victory as the employers finally realized that they could collaborate closely with Bridges.

[01:57:56] **STANLEY:** It was more like the victory won by the miners in the '77-'78 strike. The miners forced the strike on an unwilling leadership. Instead of winding up with being routed by the rank and file, they wound up with a stalemate—a checkmate kind of a settlement. They lost some but they didn't lose everything. Or like the '59 strike in steel where [David J.] McDonald [then acting-president of the United Steelworkers of America] is going to give away all these working conditions and the strike was forced on him. They kept the human relations committees from really going plant for plant, eliminating work regulations, as a result of that strike. So that you get a pyrrhic victory from the rank and file. You keep them from taking everything, but you lose some things.

[01:58:53] **HOWARD:** What did they lose in '48?

[01:58:57] **STANLEY:** They lost something. . .

[01:58:57] **HOWARD:** A two-year contract, I know that.

[01:58:59] **STANLEY:** They lost some control of hiring.

[01:59:02] **HOWARD:** Did they?

[01:59:03] **STANLEY:** I'm not clear right now on specifically how. They got that language that says "workers directed" really slapped on them. Which would be used on them forever and ever thereafter. Well, it really allowed human relations to come to the fore.

[01:59:41] **HOWARD:** Why, if that was the case—

[END PART FOUR/BEGIN PART FIVE]

—the point that I was going to make is that if these cordial relations had been building up over the years, why was it that in '48 the employers really seemed to be interested in smashing the union, particularly zeroing in on Bridges, saying, "We refuse to negotiate with a radical, a Communist, until he signs the affidavit," and everything. All these pretexts for eliminating Bridges from a position of leadership in that union.

[02:00:09] **STANLEY:** Well, there's not always union enmity with the employer ranks. What we constantly see in every kind of bureaucracy, whether it be employer or government or whatever, you see hard/soft developments. When the hards are in and really busting heads, the softs are in the wings saying, "Hey, you're going to cause an explosion, and it will blow up in your face. Then we'll have it really hard." Then the softs go in, and the hards stand in the wings and say, "You're going to give it all away. They'll want more! Give 'em an inch [they'll take a mile]." And the hards come back again. Under [Nikita] Khrushchev, he played both hard and soft. Same person, same personnel. The guy who was the head of the PMA in 1948 was hard-nosed—

[02:01:04] **HOWARD:** Was that [Frank] Foisie?

[02:01:06] **STANLEY:** Foisie. He was a real, anti-union, hard, by-the-numbers, by-the-rules guy. I think that he really believed that. He couldn't make a switch like a Khrushchev. They had to get him out. The thing to notice is that Matson took over the waterfront employers and merged it with the PSA [Pacific Stevedore Association] and made the PMA. They conducted a faction fight and won. That meant that the ship operator, who was interested in quick turnaround, made their initial victory over the labor contractors in '48.

[02:01:59] **HOWARD:** Why? Not sure I follow that. Simply the absorption of the waterfront employers union into the PSA meant a defeat for the stevedoring operators, you're saying?

[02:02:14] **STANLEY:** By Matson dominating this single organization, it was ship operator dominating labor contractor.

[02:02:22] **HOWARD:** Ok. Alright. Again, we're coming back—

[02:02:28] **STANLEY:** Now, who testified for Bridges in the deportation hearings?

[02:02:35] **HOWARD:** St. Sure, among others, right?

[02:02:37] **STANLEY:** The steamship companies, right? APL [American President Lines] and Matson. I know CP-ers at that trial, and when they saw who was testifying for Bridges, they said, “This is it.”

[02:02:47] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[02:02:47] **STANLEY:** They went into mourning. They left the Party. They left Bridges. One of them was Bridges’ bodyguard. Oh yeah. See, no way labor leader would come and help Bridges at that trial.

[02:03:06] **HOWARD:** Why?

[02:03:08] **STANLEY:** Commie. Didn’t want to be tainted. It was [during the] Cold War. Who came to help Bridges? The employers. He really got obligated, and he appreciated their help. And he felt obligated. He said, “Fuck you,” to the rest of them. “These guys helped me.”

[02:03:34] **HOWARD:** Hmm. Yeah, I can see that working at an individual level. That’s no question about it.

[02:03:42] **STANLEY:** I once had a guy sit me down who was the most intelligent observer I’ve ever met on the waterfront. [clock chiming] Longshoreman. Veteran in Spain. Expelled from the Party for militancy in 1945 for supporting the machinists’ strike in the Bay Area. He said that PMA was so sophisticated that they designed by personality a management team so that it would absolutely, personality-wise, pair off with all the people on the coast committee of the union.

[02:04:13] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[02:04:14] **STANLEY:** They got a father figure for Bridges.

[02:04:16] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[02:04:17] **STANLEY:** They got a big brother for this guy; they got a mother for this guy; and they got a strict cousin for this one.

[02:04:26] **HOWARD:** Wow, that’s amazing.

[02:04:29] **STANLEY:** I could never prove or disprove it, but it carried logic right up to its hilts because I knew the personalities in some cases. They did it.

[02:04:38] **HOWARD:** They matched. Hmm, that’s strange.

Ok. So that takes us up through the crucial period to the M&M Agreement then, up to 1960. The question is why and how that came about. I made a couple of arguments in there, one that I borrowed directly from you. One that I got out of Lincoln Fairley’s book regarding the importance on the East Coast of getting a more militant bargaining contract on the M&M because, as I recall, something to do with, they had no hiring hall, and gangs were the basic source of job security. Therefore it was important to preserve in some respects the gang structure itself. They didn’t want that undermined by—I don’t remember exactly how the argument goes now. It’s been a while. Something along those lines. The other alternative questions are: Was there a de-radicalization of the base in the ILWU that allowed them to accept a collaborationist arrangement? Would that agreement have been feasible in ‘36 or ‘37?

[02:05:52] **STANLEY:** There was de-radicalization. It was very dramatic. As Bridges began to lose his support from radicals, CP-ers who really believed in struggle, he obtained an equally important base that made him far less dependent upon the CP. He could move ahead with more freedom than he ever had.

[02:06:22] **HOWARD:** Of moderate forces within the union?

[02:06:26] **STANLEY:** In a two year period, the ILWU from 1943-1945 moved from a union with 5 percent Blacks to 55 percent Blacks. Those Blacks were primarily from Louisiana, and they were from an agrarian background. The guys—I talked to them—the guys were supporters of Huey Long [radical politician] . They believed in finding a white man who would protect them. They talked about Bridges exactly like they talked about Huey Long. They figured they owed Bridges their jobs on the waterfront.

[02:07:10] **HOWARD:** Was that true?

[02:07:11] **STANLEY:** They were an automatic “yes” vote.

[02:07:15] **HOWARD:** In Local 10?

[02:07:16] **STANLEY:** Yes. Automatic.

[02:07:21] **HOWARD:** They came in when? ‘43, you’re saying? 43-45?

[02:07:24] **STANLEY:** Well, some began in ‘42, but ‘43 and ‘44 were the big years of influx of Blacks. They were not Jim Crow-ed in a separate local like in the Boilermakers [International Brotherhood of Boilermakers] . They were brought in and became members. They got the same wages; they can vote. Not only that, they had people tell them they were the chosen people. “You’re Black; you’re the right people.” They were trained to take jobs artificially.

[02:08:04] **HOWARD:** Sort of like affirmative action ahead of its time.

[02:08:07] **STANLEY:** Precisely. Precisely.

[02:08:12] **HOWARD:** Doesn’t Bridges deserve some credit for that? Making multinational working class unity?

[02:08:17] **STANLEY:** No, no. If I am out there against sexism, in order to keep me in office, I don’t deserve the credit for that.

[02:08:29] **HOWARD:** You see it as a very cynical, manipulatory ploy.

[02:08:33] **STANLEY:** Absolutely. As a matter of fact, [?Harvey Suevos?] was sitting in the CIO headquarters in New Orleans in 1942. His girlfriend was the secretary. Bridges was inside; he [?Suevos?] could hear what he was saying through the transom. A Black had organized about 50 warehouses, an actual leader, and he was getting too popular. Bridges was using all the racist language known. “Get that son of a bitch!” According to Harvey Suevos. Harvey was not a liar. I have never heard Bridges use a racist statement in my life. I know that Bridges played on all their [his Black supporters] disadvantages, in every meeting, and he wound up with the most corrupt group of Blacks on the waterfront being his most ardent supporters.

[02:09:38] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[02:09:39] **STANLEY:** Bill Chester, he's got his hand in the rackets. And the BART [Bay Area Rapid Transit] . He got all the slot machines and vending machines at the airport, and in BART and so on, and through his connections he made through being on city commissions via ILWU leadership. [?Mosely?] is the most powerful man in Local 10 [inaudible] because he was chief dispatcher for so long. Part of the Black clique and [?Marshall?] . . .

[02:10:24] **HOWARD:** You wouldn't want to make the argument that Blacks were brought into the union and—

[02:10:30] **STANLEY:** Used as political footballs?

[02:10:32] **HOWARD:** That's what you would say? I mean, there was no ideological support for Bridges because he was fighting racism in society, and this was a haven—

[02:10:38] **STANLEY:** Yeah. That was part of it. You can't divorce the two things.

[02:10:45] **HOWARD:** Because the Hawaiian situation is similar to that, isn't it? The Hawaiian workers support Bridges in part because the ILWU took a progressive stance on questions of racial equality.

[02:10:55] **STANLEY:** Well, he's not too popular on the islands. See, they automated the islands and containerized the islands first. Took away their conditions. Longshore division of the ILWU of the islands today is the poor cousin in the union. They're nothing.

The sailors' union and the other maritime unions that were Jim Crow-ed allowed Bridges to do this. They gave him a gift. Take my union, the sailors' union. 1945 Lundeberg realized that here are all these Blacks on the waterfront; he had a Jim Crow union. Hell, he had to do something about it. So the coast committee met and came up with policy statement. That's the Mexico and Black labor report. With Morris Weisberger [leader of the Sailor's Union of the Pacific] chairing the meeting, and Harry over on the side on this box he sat on. Always ready to take the mic. "The Commies use the Blacks as political footballs. We don't do that. We don't checkerboard ships. We don't put Blacks on because that creates friction. But we're still a democratic union. The day the rank and file wants Blacks in, we'll let them."

And I got up and said, "Yes. The CP uses and Bridges uses Blacks as a political football. That's true. And, yes, we have better contracts than the National Maritime Union. But I can't go out and show that and make a point of that with any Black man on the waterfront because we don't allow them in here. Not for one minute. The report of the coastwise committee solved nothing. As a matter of fact, it creates a basis for a bigger fiasco. We have to bring Blacks in here, right in that door. Until we do, we're giving them [Bridges] the present of these Blacks as support because they have no other choice than to accept this kind of patronization from Bridges and the CP."

When the report was made, a drunk got up and said, "The day a n***** comes into this union, I'll tear up my book." After I'd been speaking, the same drunk got up and said, "Aw, I'll just take out a withdrawal card." Weisberger realized that there was a movement of minds. He said, "What would you have—" He was going to say, "What would you have done differently, Weir?" He realized I was going to be able to speak again if he asked the question because I was right on the mic again. He said, "Boom! Next point on the agenda."

[02:14:17] **HOWARD:** That was in '45?

[02:14:20] **STANLEY:** Late '45. VJ Day [Victory over Japan, marking the end of WWII, August 15 or September 2, 1945] hadn't occurred yet; VE Day [Victory in Europe, WWII, May 8, 1945] had occurred at the time. But I don't trust my memory precisely. It was late '45 or very early '46. I think it was late '45.

[02:14:39] **HOWARD:** I know, in relationship to that, that Portland was maintained as essentially a Jim Crow local for years and years. Bridges didn't push that very aggressively and argued that there was local autonomy at stake, and he didn't want to impinge on their rights—

[02:14:50] **STANLEY:** He laid off of them because he deals with those guys when he was there. But you could see from the B list. Here we were, the first B list. The union was now 65 percent Black and so was the B list.

[02:15:07] **HOWARD:** In San Francisco?

[02:15:08] **STANLEY:** Yeah. So, there was real family friction all over the place. Fathers and uncles and brothers-in-law felt they owed Bridges. But the B-men Blacks witnessed Bridges at every meeting sabotaging the efforts of the local to bring them into the union and make A-men out of them. Bridges was the young Blacks' enemy. They were telling their dads, "What's the matter with you? Think. You're not in Louisiana anymore. Get that fucking cotton out of your nappy fucking hair." I sat in kitchens and heard that. "He ain't Huey Long."

[02:16:00] **HOWARD:** Why so many from Louisiana? Is there a reason for that? I know he was in New Orleans for a while.

[02:16:05] **STANLEY:** It's strange. Louisiana Blacks have a terrible reputation among other Blacks. They're known as the tightwads; they're the Scotch [reference to Scottish people] of the Black community. Tight with—not New Orleans—central and northern Louisiana.

[02:16:23] **HOWARD:** Why did they congregate so much in San Francisco? Why from that one particular—I don't understand that at all.

[02:16:29] **STANLEY:** I think that the shipyard employers and the government, working with them, went into the most backwards possible section of the South.

[02:16:37] **HOWARD:** Is that right? That's interesting if that were true.

[02:16:41] **STANLEY:** I think you could find that.

[02:16:43] **HOWARD:** How did the process of recruitment during the war take place for shipyard employment, for instance? I have no idea.

[02:16:50] **STANLEY:** Well, signs went up in cities all over the South. Shipyards are recruiting [inaudible] .

[02:16:59] **HOWARD:** That's real interesting if that were the case.

[02:17:02] **STANLEY:** Guys tell me, "We went to town with this mule and this timber in southern Arkansas right near Louisiana, and we saw this sign. We said, 'This is it.' "

[02:17:16] **HOWARD:** Big money.

[02:17:16] **STANLEY:** It was an escape, man.

[02:17:21] **HOWARD:** Although one could also argue that that was a natural labor surplus from those parts of the South, also. It may not have been deliberately intended to bring in a certain backwards workers, but it happened to work that way.

[02:17:32] **STANLEY:** Well, I'm paranoid.

[02:17:33] **HOWARD:** [laughing] No, I know what you're saying.

[02:17:42] **STANLEY:** We underestimate the employer class. [clock chime] When I walked through the streets of Liverpool [United Kingdom], working class residential districts, and looked at the public housing that had been built in the '30s, and in the '20s after the British general strike, the first thing I noticed was this: here's the street, and here's a corner. Here's a house, and a house, and a house, and a house. And a house, and a house, and a house, and a house. These are close together, tenement-built kind of things, very little distance between each house. So I enquired, and I was right. They separated this house at the corner, and every corner back, so you couldn't put a barricade across there and leave.

[02:18:35] **HOWARD:** Is that right? [laughing] Yeah, I think sometimes you're right—there's no question about it. We do sometimes underestimate their capacities.

[02:18:53] **STANLEY:** They never relax. They are the most class conscious.

[02:18:56] **HOWARD:** Yeah, for sure.

[02:18:57] **STANLEY:** In the trial, when I was around all these PMA guys, there were times when I had to go with PMA lawyers to Xerox things—just as our share of the labor of duplicating documents. They never relaxed. They were always on edge and on guard and never said an unguarded word when I was near them. They never talked baseball or TV or anything. They were always making points. Particularly in San Francisco Maritime and that law firm, Lillick & Bean. They meet you socially, at a party.

I was at a party one night in the Bay Area, and a guy starts teasing me, "I don't charge my employer overtime if I stay 20 minutes over." I said, "Who the fuck is this asshole?" He worked for Matson. And I told him, "Get out of my face." Finally, I apologized to the hostess and left. It happened to me at a dinner, same thing, with a [Lillick & Bean?] guy. These guys treat you like you are the enemy.

It's like a Christian Endeavor [Young People's Society of Christian Endeavour] kid running across someone who says "shit" in church. They treat you with that kind of disdain. Take a class conscious traditional intellectual like Frederick Winslow Taylor [mechanical engineer]. An intellectual. He wasn't talking time study. He was talking alternative industrial relations system that could con people into working harder for the same money out of accepting a whole different ideology. He was presenting—one of the most political guys around. It's no accident that the top leadership personnel of the progressive movement and the Taylorist movement are the same people. [Samuel] Gompers was one of them.

[02:21:26] **HOWARD:** The cult of efficiency, yeah.

[02:21:33] **STANLEY:** If you read Taylor's testimony before that House of Representatives subcommittee in January 1912, [he was] a really political human being. He told people this, it would seem. But he's saying, "I'm really for the workers, and we're going to treat them better."

[02:21:55] **HOWARD:** I have seen that; that's right. I've read that.

[02:22:01] **STANLEY:** It's a whole new approach at this time. Never bought it. They utilized time study and motion study. And by the numbers, treat 'em hard.

[02:22:24] **HOWARD:** Other than the sort of racial split, which seems to exist in Local 10, are there any other political cleavages that you're aware of within the union? Along generational lines—you've suggested one, right? At least by the 1960s that emerges.

[02:22:43] **STANLEY:** Cleavages?

[02:22:44] **HOWARD:** Yeah, political cleavages in particular. Support for Bridges and non-support for Bridges. That sort of thing.

[02:22:55] **STANLEY:** Constituencies.

[02:22:56] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:22:58] **STANLEY:** You had in the '50s, when I was working under the jurisdiction of that union, the Blacks—and they weren't unanimous. You'd get Blacks voting against the Black clique and voting for whites in the situation today, like now. But you had a Black constituency that was divided. Some were union activists, and some were church activists. Some of this, some of that. But you do recognize that there are groupings that hang together. You recognize that there are groupings that are pro-Bridges and are very political. You see them diminish the more the M&M Agreement is put into effect.

[02:23:56] **HOWARD:** Who constituted those pro-Bridges groups? Was it diffuse? Are there any patterns?

[02:24:03] **STANLEY:** People who'd been around the CP.

[02:24:05] **HOWARD:** That's all?

[02:24:09] **STANLEY:** Blacks who felt that he was racially correct, but, among whites, it was mainly CP-ers or old-timers who said, "To hell with the CP-ism, I think he's right anyway because he's honest. And he never tried to steal."

But one group stands out among whites, and that's the Mission gangs. The white working class guys from the Mission District.

[02:24:43] **HOWARD:** The Mission District.

[02:24:44] **STANLEY:** The Old Mission. Their dads are longshoremen, and they're longshoremen. They appear to be apolitical like a standard American worker, but class conscious as hell on the job. They'll stand solid with you. I'd take them in a beat against almost anybody. Put aside they may be even racist culturally, sub-culturally; they may be apolitical. They may be for capital punishment and so on. But on the job, safety conditions, working conditions, and any beef that comes up, you can count on them because it's part of the subculture that comes up in the family. You can't understand longshore unless you understand how many are sons of longshoremen. That goes all the way back. The studies of [?William Soule?] on the Marseilles waterfront, the Second Republic, he went through all the records, and he found that longshoremen are the second highest number—71percent are the sons of longshoremen.

[02:26:01] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[02:26:02] **STANLEY:** Only fishermen had more, 92 percent. In this port, I would say two to one more sons of longshoremen in 'Frisco still. Sons of longshoremen, particularly along the Mission.

[02:26:20] **HOWARD:** And you're saying they constituted a basis of support for Bridges, at least—

[02:26:23] **STANLEY:** No—

[02:26:23] **HOWARD:** Oh, they didn't?

[02:26:24] **STANLEY:** They were the right wingers in the union, anti-Bridges in large part.

[02:26:32] **HOWARD:** So it's that mixture of militancy and yet apolitical, even reactionary, politics at the same time. It seems to characterize the New York situation a great deal. [laugh]

[02:26:42] **STANLEY:** I wouldn't say reactionary politics, necessarily. This is amorphous stuff—

[02:26:47] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I know.

[02:26:49] **STANLEY:** They were considered by Bridges-ites as right wingers.

[02:26:51] **HOWARD:** Were they anti-communist, ideologically? Or did that ever arise?

[02:26:57] **STANLEY:** I would say anti-communist ideologically, but they were not for making concessions. They were left wing, compared to Bridges.

[02:27:06] **HOWARD:** On trade union issues?

[02:27:07] **STANLEY:** Yeah. Far to the left.

[02:27:10] **HOWARD:** Yeah. I guess that's always the problem with me—I don't know how you can—when you're talking about trade union militancy, is there a left and a right to that? When we're talking about left and right, isn't that really something in the political spectrum that deals with political issues outside the union?

[02:27:26] **STANLEY:** Left and right as we know it is something that's been created by liberals and radicals. What really throws a left hook, a curve, at all liberals and radicals is when you run into this radical guy or gal in terms of the job who has standard politics—whatever party is safest—on the outside. And they can't make the connection. They don't see that this guy is really more radical than they are because that's where he or she lives, 8 or 9 hours a day. That's the place really to be a radical. By comparison, most of the liberals in the [inaudible] are not willing to take the chances that these guys would take. They seem to be ultra-left when it comes to some of these job actions.

[02:28:28] **HOWARD:** You see that as really a false dilemma that's being raised by intellectuals. Yeah, I'm in general agreement with that. I just haven't worked it out fully in my own head, how it works. Because if that's true, then we see in New York, after the war, a real radicalization taking place. In fact, it almost appears that they become the more radical, there's a reversal takes place. There's hardly any strikes or job actions taking place after 1948 on the West Coast, when on the East Coast it's just year after year of the rank and file coming up and saying, "No, we reject that contract. We reject that contract."

[02:29:00] **STANLEY:** '64. ILA membership in '64 and the membership of the UAW were the ones who broke the rank and file revolts out in the open.

[02:29:13] **HOWARD:** I wasn't aware of that.

[02:29:18] **STANLEY:** Yeah. There were the two largest settlements that were made that year, in '64—the auto and the East and Gulf Coast and Great West Coast longshore. Both occupations were offered the highest settlements, highest wage packages ever offered, and both rejected them. That really was qualitatively such a big exposure that it broke out into open rank and file revolts. That led directly to the aeromechanics' strike, to the subway strike. [?Gordon?] got kicked out and [inaudible] became the Rubber Workers.

[END PART FIVE/BEGIN PART SIX]

James B. Carey got the boot from IUE [International Union of Electrical Workers] . Five major International incumbent presidents. [Paul Leroy] Siemiller.

[02:30:20] **HOWARD:** Where was he?

[02:30:21] **STANLEY:** He was the president of the machinists. 1966 strike of the airline mechanics, the machinists—he negotiated two contracts. They voted them both down. The third one, Siemiller and Lyndon Baines Johnson [U.S. president] asked them to go back to work, and they said, “Screw you.” Los Angeles and San Francisco air mechanics locals both passed labor party resolutions. They demanded that Siemiller take the union out of the Democratic Party immediately.

[02:30:56] **HOWARD:** I had no idea. I hadn't heard about that. Interesting. Well, you've given me a lot to think about—too much! Making it very complicated.

[02:31:09] **STANLEY:** It's always complicated.

[02:31:11] **HOWARD:** I know.

[02:31:12] **STANLEY:** There may be one or two items to pick up here.

[02:31:22] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:31:22] **STANLEY:** First, “there's no reason to believe, nor is there any compounding evidence, communists were more adept at organizational manipulation than their opponents.” I think they are more adept.

[02:31:32] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I guess I was trying to make a distinction between manipulation and being able to facilitate one's ends through organizational means. I didn't make that very clear at all. What I'm reacting to is the standard anti-communist critique that they just stay at union meetings longer, they hand out more literature, somehow corral people to follow their line. Would you go along with that? Total manipulation, in other words? No ideological support. I can't think of— [Philip] Selznick—you ever read his material? The Organizational Weapon—that's what I was reacting to. Sociologist from the '50s, and argued that they basically were able to take over unions by placing people in strategic positions, they had not popular support, etc., etc.

[02:32:19] **STANLEY:** Organizational Weapon?

[02:32:21] **HOWARD:** Yeah, by Philip Selznick.

[02:32:23] **STANLEY:** I've read that.

[02:32:23] **HOWARD:** He's got a chapter on the NMU in there as an example of their organizational domination.

[02:32:28] **STANLEY:** Well, it's not pure either way. On the one hand, they're manipulators. [clock chiming] On the other hand, you get me to subscribe to the PW [The People's World] , The Daily Worker. I get this, that, and the other thing. I buy Paul Robeson [singer and social activist] records. I learn about the war in Spain [Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939] , and I listen to "Los Cuatros Generales." [popular song from the Spanish Civil War] There is some kind of ideology going there, too.

[02:33:02] **HOWARD:** Yeah, it's obvious that they maximized their organizational effectiveness, but that's different from manipulating organizations: placing people in key positions, scheduling meetings at strange times, that sort of stuff that they tend to emphasize in the bourgeois literature.

[02:33:20] **STANLEY:** Wait a minute, I'm preoccupied. I can't concentrate on what you're saying. [reading Howard's paper]

[02:33:23] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:33:23] **STANLEY:** The ACTU [Association of Catholic Trade Unionists] , this was around the James Kearney incident—and James Kearney was a young rebel. As a matter of fact, a lot of people said what they feared in [?Weir?] was that he was a left-wing Jim Kearney. But Kearney's Catholicism was pretty loose. I wouldn't say he was run by ACTU like Father [Charles Owen] Rice was.

[02:34:05] **HOWARD:** He was a Local 10 leader, right? Yeah, ok. So, ACTU's involvement in Local 10, I may have overestimated it.

[02:34:19] **STANLEY:** Possibly. I really can't say.

[02:34:23] **HOWARD:** Was the religious split at all significant? Did Catholics tend to align themselves in an anti-Bridges position, or do you know?

[02:34:29] **STANLEY:** I don't know. Bridges, of course, was a Catholic.

[02:34:34] **HOWARD:** Right.

[02:34:35] **STANLEY:** He became an anti-Catholic, but he was still a Catholic. There's something very religious about the way he—if you will read his speech at the Disneyland Conference of the National Defense Transportation Association, he says, "You guys wanted someone to go and talk to the Russians into lowering their rates in container shipping, and I went for you. I did a job, right? I did this for you, and that for you. Well, you better make up your minds. The Russians got something you haven't. They got one steamship line. They've nationalized it. You'd be better off doing that here, more efficiently. Have one big one."

[Stanley reads Howard's paper and responds] Agitating for Russia? Jesus Christ.

[Stanley reads Howard's paper and responds] The guaranteed weekly income—never, not one penny, was ever used for the guaranteed weekly income.

[02:35:52] **HOWARD:** Did I say that?

[02:35:53] **STANLEY:** Well, you didn't say it. I'm telling you. You did say, here on page 16, "In exchange the employers agreed to pay into a specially created fund for the purposes of protecting economic security in the union's existing longshore membership, either through permanent retirement allowances, a guaranteed weekly income, or relocation." Relocation was never mentioned other than, "We may have to bring some guys from one port to another." Not into relocation to other industries.

[02:36:24] **HOWARD:** Yeah, that's what I intended, I guess, was relocating smaller ports.

[02:36:27] **STANLEY:** Two: a guaranteed weekly income. Never one longshoreman got one penny of that.

[02:36:34] **HOWARD:** But it was intended, right? Or something?

[02:36:37] **STANLEY:** In case there would be short work weeks, but there was never that. We were still doing break bulk cargo. During the life of both of those contracts. We were pretty much in the break bulk cargo with plenty of work when the Vietnamese War was on.

[02:36:54] **HOWARD:** So the only added value was really the pension then?

[02:36:56] **STANLEY:** Only one. They had a lot of trouble with that. A lot of guys didn't collect it right. All kind of taxation was done on it.

One of the things that we should take some part of, too, was. . . [pause] Bridges negotiated a contract in which these funds would be developed by the number of hours worked. First it was tenure. Then it was switched to hours. The ILA leadership had a fit. They said, "You dummy. You say you're for Lewis? Lewis did it on tonnage." Because if you keep it on tonnage, you always have a big fund. Man hours, your fund's going to be diminishing.

[02:37:48] **HOWARD:** That's right. So why do you suppose he went for hours?

[02:37:52] **STANLEY:** He was in their pocket.

[02:37:58] **HOWARD:** Should be, "The origins and decline of radical labor." Not the "durability".

[02:38:09] **STANLEY:** The only one thing accurate about the [Charles P.] Larrowe book is that.

[02:38:12] **HOWARD:** He never explains that, I don't think. You're left hanging. Where's the final chapter about the decline? Even to the very end, he's defending him. Didn't make any sense to me. Though the subtitle was intriguing, if nothing else.

The only other question I had at this point was whether you know of any other longshoremen that I might be able to interview? To shed light on some of these questions. Particularly the Wobbly situation, which I find very fascinating, and anything else. I realize it's a little difficult bringing an academic down to who they don't know.

[02:38:51] **STANLEY:** Well, I know a lot of guys in this port, for example, and in other ports. But I don't ever admit to a public relationship with anybody because it can become a liability to them.

[02:39:10] **HOWARD:** You're that hot, huh?

[02:39:11] **STANLEY:** At first it was open. "Don't talk to me now. Meet me around the corner." Or "come to my house, but only at night."

[02:39:23] **HOWARD:** Is that—I can’t believe!

[02:39:25] **STANLEY:** Totalitarian atmosphere.

[02:39:27] **HOWARD:** Yes. It’s very much like that in the Bay Area. Talking to Herb Mills, he had to look around like this constantly before he could say anything. It’s gross.

[02:39:46] **STANLEY:** There are some guys here that can be talked to. I don’t know how I can introduce you to them.

[02:39:58] **HOWARD:** I certainly don’t want to jeopardize you in any way.

[02:40:00] **STANLEY:** No, you wouldn’t. Not me.

[02:40:01] **HOWARD:** Or them. As far as that goes.

[02:40:05] **STANLEY:** No, I don’t have anything to worry about. Might be a couple of guys. Might be.

[02:40:21] **HOWARD:** Larrowe quoted someone named George Love?

[02:40:23] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[02:40:24] **HOWARD:** Know him?

[02:40:25] **STANLEY:** He was an arbitrator—well, he was.

[02:40:28] **HOWARD:** Wait, that isn’t what he says in the book at all.

[02:40:31] **STANLEY:** George Love is a longshoreman, he was the president in Local 13, but he became an arbitrator.

[02:40:36] **HOWARD:** Oh, he did, ok. I just got an excellent quote from him about during the war. Bridges comes down and tries to sell the proposal to lift the sling load limits. He says, “Get that Stalinist crap out of here; we’re not interested in that.” [laughs]

[02:40:48] **STANLEY:** Lincoln Fairley became an arbitrator, as did Germaine Bulcke.

[02:40:53] **HOWARD:** Oh, he did, too?

[02:41:01] **STANLEY:** In this port.

[02:41:03] **HOWARD:** Hmm, that’s strange.

[02:41:06] **STANLEY:** And delivered more to the employer than anybody else.

[02:41:12] **HOWARD:** He was close to Bridges, right?

[02:41:14] **STANLEY:** Yeah. The Bridges guys on the B-list and the A-list in the fifties—the real Bridges guys were the production guys.

[02:41:27] **HOWARD:** Did the fact that the ILWU was an independent union, somewhat isolated from the labor mainstream, have any impact on pushing them to the right? Or would they have been moving in that direction regardless?

[02:41:45] **STANLEY:** Well, I think that in all probability the isolation now for the union is more difficult for the ILWU. They couldn't get more extensive support in other areas, and they were forced to make more concessions because of the isolation. If you want to call that "to the right," I'd say it was more on the defensive, more victimized.

[02:42:05] **HOWARD:** Yeah, ok.

[02:42:06] **STANLEY:** You had to conservatize your demands to the employer because you didn't have the ability to swing as much weight certainly. The [Jimmy] Hoffa-Bridges alliance is the first break in that. It meant more Teamster support in the fight, potentially. Not a bureaucratic problem.

Hoffa couldn't figure Bridges out.

[02:42:47] **HOWARD:** A very enigmatic character. I haven't been able to make any sense out of him at all. I'd like to try to interview him at some point. I don't know if that's ever possible. He's very reluctant to do that, but I'd like to.

[02:43:09] **STANLEY:** He might tell you something; you never know about Bridges.

[02:43:12] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I have no idea. Is there a way that I could proceed to contact the people that you know down here, or. . . ? I don't want to jeopardize you or them. That's not the purpose of the research.

[02:43:27] **STANLEY:** I understand. I don't know. Let me give it some thought.

[02:43:34] **HOWARD:** Ok, fair enough.

[02:43:36] **STANLEY:** Are you going back to 'Frisco?

[02:43:40] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I should be going back around July or August sometime. Hopefully even up to the Northwest. I'd like to make a trip at some point. [pause]

But you can mull it over for a while.

[02:44:03] **STANLEY:** You might go to Coos Bay?

[02:44:06] **HOWARD:** I could see that I could if there was something worth going there for.

[02:44:11] **STANLEY:** If you ever get to Coos Bay, look up a [?Nick Montgomery?] .

[02:44:14] **HOWARD:** [?Nick Montgomery?] ?

[02:44:15] **STANLEY:** He's well known.

[02:44:17] **HOWARD:** Ok. Trace him through the union?

[02:44:18] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[02:44:21] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:44:24] **STANLEY:** In the Northwest, an important guy in Seattle is. . .an Irish name. Not [Jesse] Stranahan [Portland longshore leader] . . . Shit. Can't think of his name. He's retired now, but he was a Trotskyite. He was the main guy in the longshore there in Seattle. [Shaun Maloney]

[02:44:52] **HOWARD:** Is that right?

[02:44:53] **STANLEY:** Can't remember. Socialist Workers Party guy.

[02:44:59] **HOWARD:** Held office in the union?

[02:45:00] **STANLEY:** The guy in the port.

[02:45:00] **HOWARD:** What are your politics? Were you SWP? Or do you want to talk about it?

[02:45:05] **STANLEY:** I was in the Workers' Party.

[02:45:05] **HOWARD:** Oh, you were. Ok. Which is what, a left wing split-off from the SWP?

[02:45:10] **STANLEY:** Yeah.

[02:45:10] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I'd like see that. That would be very interesting. What's the guy's name—you don't know?

[02:45:21] **STANLEY:** Everybody knows the guy up there. He's got an Irish name.

[02:45:26] **HOWARD:** I think I even may have heard his name before, but I don't remember it now.

[02:45:29] **STANLEY:** He was a leading light in that local for a long time. Object of a big witch hunt by Bridges.

If you go to San Francisco, you ought to look up Selden Osborne.

[02:45:49] **HOWARD:** Never heard of him.

[02:45:51] **STANLEY:** He was the most constant opposition to Bridges for 20 years.

[02:46:01] **HOWARD:** Left opposition?

[02:46:02] **STANLEY:** Yeah. Pacifist. He's in the retirees of Local 10. He's the only one who made it all the way cross county in the long march.

[02:46:16] **HOWARD:** Oh, is that right?

[02:46:16] **STANLEY:** The only who walked all the way to Baltimore [Maryland] .

[02:46:23] **HOWARD:** I don't think at the union, if he's an oppositional character, that they're going to give me any information on him. Do you know any—

[02:46:28] **STANLEY:** Oh, he's in the phonebook.

[02:46:29] **HOWARD:** He'll be in the phonebook?

[02:46:30] **STANLEY:** Selden Osborne.

[02:46:31] **HOWARD:** O-S-B-O-R-N?

[02:46:32] **STANLEY:** -E.

[02:46:33] **HOWARD:** -E. Ok. Maybe I'll check him out then.

[02:46:37] **STANLEY:** If you can get into the retirees club, some of these guys are still so paranoid, they won't talk. An important guy in that local has always been [?Frank Stout?] . Very important guy.

[02:46:54] **HOWARD:** These are oppositional people mostly, right?

[02:46:57] **STANLEY:** Yeah. It's easy to find pro-Bridges guys. You'll have no problem with all them. The idea is to find intelligent social critics who are independent of Bridges, as I see it.

[02:47:15] **HOWARD:** Yeah, I agree.

[02:47:17] **STANLEY:** Frank Stout was always one of those. He was expelled from the local. [clock chiming]

Who's the nationally famous civil libertarian? Old, old man. Maybe he's died.

[02:47:44] **HOWARD:** Not [?Ira Stone?] ?

[02:47:45] **STANLEY:** Civil libertarian. Straight civil libertarian. There's an institute named after him. Stout is his son-in-law. Katz . .

[02:48:19] **HOWARD:** Ok, well, that gives me something to go on at least, if I get up north. In the meantime, if anything occurs to you about L.A., there's time.

[02:48:28] **STANLEY:** Another one you might call up there—Hal [Harold] Yanow.

[02:48:35] **HOWARD:** Y-A-N-O?

[02:48:36] **STANLEY:** Y-A-N-O-W.

[02:48:39] **HOWARD:** San Francisco?

[02:48:41] **STANLEY:** [inaudible] .

[02:48:42] **HOWARD:** Alright. And, in each case, is it permissible to say that I got the information through you, or is that. . . ?

[02:48:49] **STANLEY:** Ah, Osborne, ok.

[02:48:56] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:49:05] **STANLEY:** With the others, no.

[02:49:05] **HOWARD:** Alright, I'll just work out some other approach then.

[02:49:12] **STANLEY:** You can say to a guy like Stout—well, I know, get to Osborne, and he will—

[02:49:26] **HOWARD:** Tell me about the others?

[02:49:27] **STANLEY:** Yes.

[02:49:27] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:49:27] **STANLEY:** He's a very cooperative guy.

[02:49:28] **HOWARD:** Ok. He should be in the phonebook. That's great. I was asking people at the ILWU library and Lincoln Fairley and a few other people, and they just weren't going to give me anybody else but loyalists.

[02:49:41] **STANLEY:** Osborne is the key to the old-timers who opposed Harry.

[02:49:45] **HOWARD:** Oh, is that right? That would be good to know, then.

[02:49:49] **STANLEY:** Osborne. . . [pause] But he has gotten so idiosyncratic, he might not be in the phonebook.

[02:50:02] **HOWARD:** But he's a retired member of the local, so, if they're at all cooperative, they might let me. . . I don't know.

[02:50:12] **STANLEY:** If you mention him, they'll look at you like—

[02:50:14] **HOWARD:** I know. When I went up there the first, she was looking around for my credential, I said—

[02:50:19] **STANLEY:** Who are you talking about?

[02:50:20] **HOWARD:** The librarian, Schwartz, Carol Schwartz. She seemed reasonable to me, but she knows the politics of the union. So I'm dropping names as much as I can. "Andrew Mills?" "Oh, he won't doing any good!" "Ok." So she told me, "Don't bring that up again." That's her way of saying.

[02:50:41] **STANLEY:** I didn't think she was that sectarian.

[02:50:42] **HOWARD:** She's knows what's going on. She knows where the bread is buttered. I couldn't tell exactly what she was doing because, when I went up there and said, "I'd like to look at the archival materials," she said, "Oh, I don't think there'll be any problem." [Barry] Silverman, the research director, was out of town so they took my request upstairs to somebody else and came back, "No, you can't do it." She was very strange when she came back and was saying stuff like, "I don't know why this happened." She took me over into the corner of the room and said, "But they're really not into advancing academic research, and you'll just have to be very cautious," and laid this total paranoid trip on me.

[02:51:12] **STANLEY:** Oh, I know how. I'll give you a name—Mark Sharron. S-H-A-R-R-O-N. A friend of Osborne's and lives near him.

[02:51:26] **HOWARD:** Ok.

[02:51:26] **STANLEY:** Use my name, and he'll lead you to Osborne.

[02:51:30] **HOWARD:** Ok, was Sharron a former Local 10? Or just a friend? Ok. So if Osborne isn't in the phonebook, I can go through Sharron then.

[02:51:44] **STANLEY:** Selden is a member of the Unitarian church, and the UU [Unitarian Universalist Church] is right across the street from the ILWU International headquarters.

[02:51:51] **HOWARD:** That's on Franklin Street?

[02:51:52] **STANLEY:** Yeah, he hangs out there.

[02:51:55] **HOWARD:** Ok. That looks good then. Alright. The last thing I want to talk to you about—

[END PART SIX]